hiding right under Eisav's nose

Rashi in last week's parsha quotes the gemara in Meg 17a that Yaakov spent 14 years in yeshivat Shemv'Eiver before heading to Lavan's house. The events at the beginning of our parsha pick up the story at the point Yaakov is finally leaving yeshiva.

If I had to ask you the address of Yeshivat Shem v'Eiver, where would you say it is located? What zip code do you put on the envelope when you mail in your donation?

Maharasha makes the logical deduction that if our parsha is resuming the story at the point Yaakov leaves the yeshiva, וַיֵּצֵ֥א יַעֲקֹ֖ב מִבְּאֵ֣ר שָׁ֑בַע means that the yeshiva must have been located in Be'er Sheva:

ויש לדקדק דא"כ מבית עבר אחר שהיה שם י"ד שנים הלך לארם נהרים וקרא כתיב ויצא יעקב מבאר שבע וילך חרנה ואמרינן במסכת חולין בפ' ג"ה כי מטא לחרן כו' וחזר למקום שהתפללו אבותיו וכו' וסולם היה עומד בבאר שבע כו' מכל זה מוכח דמבאר שבע הלך לחרן ולא מבאר שבע לבית עבר ואחר י"ד שנים הלך לחרן

Yet as you may recall from parshas Toldos -- וַיִּקְרָ֥א אֹתָ֖הּ שִׁבְעָ֑ה עַל־כֵּ֤ן שֵׁם־הָעִיר֙ בְּאֵ֣ר שֶׁ֔בַע עַ֖ד הַיּ֥וֹם הַזֶּֽה׃ (26:33) -- Be'er Sheva was where Yitzchak and Rivka were living. No problem, says the Maharasha. It must be that Yaakov never left his hometown, and may even have studied in yeshiva with his father.  The Maharsha throws a little letter jumble in as icing on the cake:

יש ליישב דבית עבר נמי בבאר שבע ולא הלך כלל מבאר שבע לבית עבר אלא שהיה מוטמן בבאר שבע בבית עבר מפני יראת אחיו עד אחר י"ד שנים הלך משם לחרן ותו לא מידי ויש רמז במלות באר שבע שיש בו אותיות עבר וארבע עשרה ועוד נראה דאביו יצחק נמי היה לו בית המדרש כדאמרינן ביומא יצחק זקן ויושב בישיבה היה כו' וכל שלשה מדרשות של שם ושל עבר ושל יצחק בבאר שבע היו ורמז מבאר שבע אותיות ש"ם עב"ר א"ב

How can this be?  If the whole point of Yaakov fleeing home to go to Uncle Lavan was to escape the wrath of Eisav, asks R' Chaim Kanievsky in Divrei Siach, then how could he hang around in his own backyard in Be'er Sheva for 14 years? Why wasn't he afraid that Eisav would catch him during those years?!

R' Chaim answers that Yaakov knew that if there is on place that Eisav won't stop foot, it's inside yeshiva. Therefore, what better place than that to hide?

You can interpret this in a broader sense, as R' Yitzchak Shmuel Gamzu, the AB"D of Haifa does, as implying that when a person is enveloped by the ruchniyus of beis medrash, the Eisavs of the world, the yetzer ha'ra, the various evils out there, cannot disturb that sacred space.   

While R' Chaim focusses on the fact that Eisav would not cross the threshold of beis medrash to enter, the flipside is no less true.  For those fourteen years Yaakov did not cross the threshold to leave the beis medrash. There was no bein ha'zmanim trip to the zoo or the amusement park. It was 24x7 in front of the shetender, no other pursuits.

With this background we can answer a different question posed by all the meforshei Rashi.

לא היה צריך לכתוב אלא: וילך יעקב חרנה, למה הזכיר יציאתו? אלא מגיד שיציאת צדיק עושה רושם, שבזמן שהצדיק בעיר – היא הודה היא זיווה היא הדרה, יצא משם – פינה זיווה פינה הדרה.

Why does Rashi make this point only here? Why not mention it when Yitzchak travelled from place to place, or when Avraham travelled from place to place?

Chazon Ish answered that Avraham was famous and wealthy; he was treated like a king by his contemporaries.  Yitzchak followed in his father's footsteps.  Avimelech, King of Grar, acknowledged that his wealth and success.  It's no chiddush that people took note of their comings and goings.  The paparazzi probably followed them around. Yaakov, however, was different.  Yaakov was a yeshiva bachur through and through, not doing anything other than parking himself in front of a gemara.  Who knew who he was? Who would recognize what he was accomplishing?  Therefore davka here, when Yaakov leaves, the Torah makes the point that יציאת צדיק עושה רושם to show that it has nothing to do with external fame and fortune, with celebrity status, but the "roshem" comes from the intrinsic value of the tzadik's spiritual achievement.  

I would add that Rashi perhaps makes the point here to show that יציאת צדיק עושה רושם is something that is built into the teva. So long as Yaakov was sitting and learning, Eisav was not going to bother him. So why would he want anyone to notice when he picked up to leave? Why wouldn't he want to sneak out, and let Eisav think that he's still inside the yeshiva?  To use my example of the paparazzi, why not put on a disguise to escape notice?  It must be that Yaakov had no choice in the matter. יציאת צדיק עושה רושם is not something you can choose to happen or not happen. It's a psik reisha, it's part of the way things work, that when a tzadik departs, the spiritual energy of the place is automatically drained.

the "minhag" of adding a bit of water to the cup before putting in the oil for your chanukah menorah

I don't buy those pre-filled cups with oil for my menorah.  I do things the old fashioned way and pour in the oil myself.  Unlike the pre-filled cups, which to the best of my recollection, are completely filled with oil, I always add a little water to the bottom of the cup.  

I never thought of this as a minhag; I thought it's just common sense because I don't want the fire to burn down and char and blacken the cup.  Lo and behold, take a look at this Baal haTurim and the notes in the Oz v'Hadar Mikraos Gedolos:

Baal haTurim writes that the three wells which Yitzchak dug correspond to 1) the Babylonian exile; 2) the complaints of Haman against the Jews who were trying to rebuild the Mikdash; 3) the Greeks, who tried to prevent us from fulfilling the mitzvah of p'ru u'revu by banning the use of mikveh.  

The Greeks failed, says Baal haTurim, because a miracle happened and a spring emerged in every person's home so that each person had a personal mikveh to use.  This is why, says the Imrei Emes, the text of the bracha is "she'asah nisim," in the plural, not nes, in the singular.  The bracha commemorates not only the nes of the oil on Chanukah, but also the nes of the mikveh (but we say the bracha on Purim as well?  You got me.)  

And this is why there is a minhag to add a little water to the bottom of the cup before you fill it with oil.  It's not just to prevent the cup from being blackened, but ir's an allusion to this miracle of the mikveh.

Rebbi and Antoninus as the answer to Rivka's worries

Rivka was troubled by the pains she experienced in pregnancy, וַיִּתְרֹֽצְצ֤וּ הַבָּנִים֙ בְּקִרְבָּ֔הּ וַתֹּ֣אמֶר אִם־כֵּ֔ן לָ֥מָּה זֶּ֖ה אָנֹ֑כִי, to the point of regretting the whole thing, as Rashi comments, למה זה אנכי – מתאוה ומתפללת על ההריון. The gemara in Brachos (10) tells us that Chizkiyahu did not want to have children because he saw that Menashe would come from his offspring. Yeshayahu haNavi came to him with the message בַּהֲדֵי כַּבְשֵׁי דְרַחֲמָנָא לְמָה לָךְ? You have no business getting involved in Hashem's plans. It's not your job to make cheshbonos based on what you think the better or worse outcome might be. Your job is to do the mitzvah you were commanded to do and then leave the rest up to Hashem. Yet here we see that Rivka made also made a cheshbon, like Chizkiyahu, and thought maybe it would have been better to not have children.

The Brisker Rav explained that there is a difference between Rivka and Chizkiyahu. Chizkiyahu was metzuveh in peru u'revu, so he had no choice. Rivka, as a woman, was not obligated in peru u'revu. Therefore, she argued that b'shlama Yitzchak Avinu who is metzuveh, he has to do what he has to do, but למה זה אנכי, I have no mitzvah, so why should I have to have anything to do with it.

(You can maybe sharpen this vort of the Brisker Rav a little bit in light of the chiddush of Meshech Chochma in parshas Noach that the reason women are exempt from peru u'revu is gufa because they have tzaar leida. "Derache'ha darkei noam" and the Torah would not command that which inevitably and unavoidably engenders pain.  Since Rivka was in such pain, it only served to underscore the fact that she had no obligation.)

Riva consulted a navi and was told that the explanation of her strange and difficult pregnancy pains is that "shnei goyim b'bitneich."

How did that answer allay Rivka's worries? The simplest explanation is that Rivka assumed she was carrying a single baby, and was concerned with the unusual pains she was experiencing. The navi (they didn't have an ultrasound) revealed that she was having twins, and that's why the pregnancy was more difficult. As Rashbam writes, שני גוים – אל תיראי, כי צער העיבור שלך בשביל ששני תאומים יש בבטנך, שמרובה צער העיבור של שנים מעיבור אחד.

This approach is not very satisfying. Was there no one else in the area who had carried twins or a midwife who had delivered twins who could have advised Rivka that her pains were normal for such a pregnancy? And if the fact that she is carrying twins alone is the answer to her fears, why does the Torah continue and tell us that the two babies will become different nations, etc.? What does that have to do with what Rivka wanted to know? Rashbam addresses the point: ומתוך שהנביא התחיל לומר לה, גמר ופירש לה כל העתידות.

If the answer to Rivka given in the pesukim seems perplexing enough, Chazal go a step further and tell us that "shnei goyim b'bitneich" refers to Antoninus and Rebbe, as the gemara (A"Z 11a) quoted by Rashi relates:

אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: אַל תִּקְרֵי ״גּוֹיִם״ אֶלָּא ״גֵּיִים״, זֶה אַנְטוֹנִינוּס וְרַבִּי, שֶׁלֹּא פָּסְקוּ מֵעַל שׁוּלְחָנָם לֹא חֲזֶרֶת וְלֹא קִישּׁוּת וְלֹא צְנוֹן, לֹא בִּימוֹת הַחַמָּה וְלֹא בִּימוֹת הַגְּשָׁמִים,

Chazal apparently understood that to answer Rivka's concerns it was not only not enough to tell her that she was carrying twins, not only not enough to tell her that each will become a great nation in its own right, but she had to be given an almost prophetic vision of generations later Rebbi and Antoninus sharing great success and chashivus, as demonstrated by the table they were able to set (see Gur Aryeh).

Clearly Chazal must have understood that Rivka was worried about more than pregnancy aches and pains.

We have what Chazal understand to be the answer to her questions and concerns. It's up to us to play Jeapordy and figure out the question Rivka was asking. I want to explore two possibilities, both of which revolve around the idea of cooperation:

First, the explanation of Chida, who writes that what bothered Rivka was the fact that even if she were carrying twins, it makes no sense that two such completely different children should come from the same womb. When she passed a beis avodah zarah, one baby got excited; when she passed a beis medrash, the other got excited. This is not the pattern of the Avos' family. Yishmael came from a different mother than Yitzchak. Should not Eisav come from a different mother than Yaakov?

Hashem answered Rivka's worry by showing her Antoninus, who served Rebbi with respect and admiration. Eisav and Yaakov are not like Yishmael and Yitzchak. There *can* be cooperation between the two, albeit not in their lifetimes, and perhaps not for generations later, but the fact that there can be this relationship is not coincidence. It's because "shnei goyim b'bitneich," it's because both Yaakov and Eisav come from the same root, the same womb, that there exists the potential for harmony between them. Maharal writes that Chazal single out Rebbi and Anotinus because they were contemporaries, and thus parallel Yaakov and Eisav who were twins. Rivka is being shown the potential that exists in Yaakov and Eisav, even though the reality is, as we know from history, that harmony was more an exception than the rule.

A second approach appears in the Be'er Mayim Chaim from the Chernobeler. In order to get inside his worldview and the framework for his thinking, let me preface how he handles a side question on this gemara raised by Tos. Tos asks: The gemara (Kes 104) tells us that on his deathbed Rebbi said that he did not get one drop of enjoyment from anything in olam ha'zeh. Doesn't this conflict with the portrayal of Rebbi here as sharing a lavish table with Antoninus?

Tosfos answers that the table was set lavishly for the guests and others, but Rebbi himself did not partake. In a similar vein, Maharal in Gur Aryeh suggests that setting the table with the hard to get radishes and lettuce was all for show, but not for consumption:

והשתא נראה מה שאמר רבי בשעת פטירתו שלא נהנה מן העולם הזה אפילו באצבע קטנה, זה אין דומה לזה, דצנון וחזרת אין זה הנאה כלל, אלא שהיה בוחר בזה להחשיב את עצמו, והוא דרך החשובים כאשר ראוי לפי חשיבות הנפש שלהם, אבל שיהיה נוטה אחר הנאתו ותאותו – לא נטה

Here's the Be'er Mayim Chaim's answer:

ובזה אפשר לתרץ קושיות התוספות שם בעבודה זרה (י"א.) שכתבו על הא דאמרינן שלא פסקה מעל שולחנם לא צנון וכו' וזה לשונם: ואף על גב שרבי לא נהנה מן העולם אפילו באצבע קטנה מכל מקום אוכלי שולחנו היו רבים עד כאן. ולדברינו בלא זה ניחא כי יוכל להיות שיאכל האדם כל מעדנים ומטעמים שבעולם ולא יהנה מהם כל עיקר מרוב הפחד והאימה ושבירת התאוה בימים רבים כאמור.

Rebbi did in fact take part in consuming the delicacies that were put out. However, that does not mean he had hanaah. Let me give you a mashal. If you have ever had the experience of having to attend a dinner event for some organization where you have to sit through hours of speeches while eating your food, you know very well what it means to attend a banquet but have no hanaah from any of it : )

For Rebbi, eating was part and parcel of his avodas Hashem. Every piece of food was an opportunity to sanctify gashmiyus. Every piece of food was consumed l'shem Shamayim. If that's what you have on your mind with every bite that you eat, then eating is avodah -- it's not hanaah.

The Be'er Mayim Chaim is so enveloped in this mindset that he cannot fathom why Tos did not give this answer, a point I'll come back to:

ואנכי לא זכיתי להבין דברי קדשם כי האם אפשר שרבי לא אכל כל ימיו והיה מתענה או לא בא אל אשתו מעודו והרי היה לו בנים ומוכרחים אנו לומר שבודאי עסק בכל דברי העולם כבני אדם רק שלא נהנה מהם. והדמיון לזה הוא כמו שאמר רבי אליעזר (נדרים כ':) ודומה עלי כמי שכפאו שד. הרי שלא היה רצונו בשום אופן לתאוה ולא היה חומד ומתאוה אליה כלל כי היה מאוס אצלו בתכלית המיאוס כי הנה תאות אשה לחמת מלא צואה דימוה חז"ל (שבת קנ"ב.).

With this background, coming back to Rivka's worries and pains, he writes:

Yaakov and Eisav were in constant conflict, even in the womb. If one gave an inch, the other pounced on it and grabbed it. Why was Yaakov, wondered Rivka, so intent on capturing what Eisav had? As Chasam Sofer asks, it would seem that Yaakov and Eisav should be able to split things evenly, with one taking olam ha'zeh and the other olam ha'ba, and shalom for all involved.

The chiddush revealed to Rivka s that to be a Yaakov Avinu does not mean giving up olam ha'zeh, but rather utilizing it as a tool l'shem shamayim. "Shnei goyim b'bitneich" -- both Yaakov and Eisav share the same womb, live in the same world of olam ha'zeh. The difference between them is what they want to achieve. You can and will have in the future two people sitting at the same table, Rebbi and Antoninus, each with the same food in front of them, each partaking of the same meal, yet they will be world's apart. One has no personal hanaah from the experience at all; one revels in his enjoyment of the meal. One sees the world through the lens of avodas Hashem; one sees it through the lens of serving himself.

The Chernobeler also see the lesson of Yaakov and Eisav both being בְּבִטְנֵךְ as one of cooperation, but not cooperation between Eisav and Yaakov, like the Chida suggests, but cooperation between Yaakov's own holy neshoma and his guf, which is bound to olam ha'zeh, the same world as Eisav.

The Chernobeler's answer requires accepting an entire framework and view of how to relate to gashmiyus which does not sit very well with the world of Lithuanian mussar. R' Shteinman in Ayeles haShachar notes that despite the Chernobeler's bewilderment at Tos, as he writes לא זכיתי להבין דברי קדשם, the fact still remains that Tos does not offer the Chernobeler's answer. This indicates, says R' Shteinman, that they do not buy into this world view. It is impossible to enjoy all the luscious treats of olam ha'zeh and remain immune from getting any pleasure or enjoyment from the experience. It's a nice theory, but it does not comport with reality.

Lulei d'mistafina to stick my head between these mountains, I would point to the gemara of מתעסק בחלבים ועריות חייב שכן נהנה as a proof to R' Shteinman. A person cannot claim as an out that true, they ate cheilev, but had no enjoyment from the experience and therefore is patur. The enjoyment is inevitable, as we cannot escape our human nature.

Are the Avos in Chevron this Shabbos along with the thousands of others who are there?

Many people make a point of spending this Shabbos in Chevron in commemoration of the episode of Avraham Avinu buying Me'aras haMachpeila recorded in this week's parsha.  I found the following in Koveitz b'Ivkei Siach, a collection of questions posed to R Ch Kanievsky on various topics.  The interlocutor prefaced his question to R' Chaim with a story.  A bachur told R' Dovid Povarsky that he went on a trip to Chevron on Chol HaMoed to visit the Avos.  R' Dovid replied that he shouldn't have bothered, as they are not there.  Shocked, the bachur asked R' Dovid what he meant, as he went to Me'aras haMachpeila where they are buried.  R' Dovid explained that there is a Zohar (don't ask me where) that says from chatzos on erev Shabbos until motzei Shabbos the neshomos go to the makom Mikdash and are therefore are not in Chevron at that time.  (R' Dovid presumably help that this is not a din in Shabbos, but a din in any yom kadosh, including Chol ha'Moed.)  The question posed to R' Chaim is whether the same holds true of other kivrei tzadikim, which would mean there is no point to visiting their graves on erev Shabbos.  For the record, R' Chaim held that this Zohar only applies to the Avos.  Ad kan the story and the question.  What I want to focus on is the footnote added by the interlocutor: If this is correct, then what's the point of spending Shabbos Chayei Sarah in Chevron and davening by Me'aras haMachpeila?  The Avos are not found there on Shabbos!  He ends off, "Yesh l'ayein."

I think perhaps drawing this conclusion misses the point of the parsha and the point of the Shabbos in Chevron, as it assumes the only reason to go to Chevron or Me'aras haMachpeila is because it is a place of kivrei tzadikim.  Obviously there is a huge difference between the Avos and other tzadikim, but in this person's mind, conceptually at least, the idea of being in Chevron is akin to visiting R' Nachman's kever in Ukraine.  The tzadik lived; the tzadik died; his kever becomes a shrine, if you will, to his spirit. 

Our parsha is about much more than that.  This is the coda to Sarah's life, and essentially to Avraham's life.  We can now look back and see the results of that mission which started with the command to go  אֶל הָאָרֶץ אֲשֶׁר אַרְאֶךָּ, with the promise that וְאֶעֶשְׂךָ לְגוֹי גָּדוֹל וַאֲבָרֶכְךָ וַאֲגַדְּלָה שְׁמֶךָ וֶהְיֵה בְּרָכָה.  Would Avraham be able to make a home in that land?  He faced famine in the land, he faced war, he saw the destruction of whole cities in the land, the land caused a breakup between himself and his closest family member, Lot.  Yet, Avraham stuck with it.  We see that Hashem's promise was therefore fulfilled, and Avraham was blessed with riches, he became great, and in our parsha is now referred to as  נְשִׂיא אֱלֹקים אַתָּה בְּתוֹכֵנוּ. He is now as much a תוֹשָׁב as he is/was a גֵּר, with all the rights that that entails.  Avraham's staking a claim in Chevron is not just about making an ohel that will become a place of spiritual pilgrimage, as that could just as well be in the Ukraine or in Cambria Heights, Queens.  The point pf Avraham buying land is proving that not only in life, but in death as well, his attachment, our attachment, to Eretz Yisrael never ceases.  Ibn Ezra puts it succinctly:

 

ונזכרה זאת הפרשה: להודיע מעלת ארץ ישראל מכל הארצות לחיים ולמתים.

ועוד: לקיים דבר השם לאברהם להיות לו נחלה.

 

So even if the Avos are not there at that moment, we still celebrate their title to the land which remains with us to this very day.

 

Even the shlichut to find a wife for Yitzchak, which immediately follows the story of Avraham buying a burial plot in Chevron, underscores this same theme.  Why does Avraham warn Eliezer not to take a wife for Yitzchak from the local Canaani tribes?  Chizkuni answers:

 

מבנות הכנעני – פן יאמרו עלי על ידי ירושה ומתנה נכנס הוא לארץ לפיכך איני רוצה אלא על ידי הקב״ה שיתננה לי בחזקה

 

Even in marrying off his son, Avraham never lost sight of stiving to fulfill that initial command and promise of Eretz Yisrael which Hashem made to him.

hidur, zerizus, mitzvah bo yoseir m'bshlucho -- which takes precedence over the other?

What takes precedence, zerizus or hidur? Is it better to do a mitzvah faster, or to do it in a nicer way? For example, if you can take a lulav and esrog and fulfill your mitzvah first thing in the morning or you can wait until later in the day and fulfill the mitzvah with a more beautiful esrog, which is the better choice?  Or to take another example, poskim quote the Terumas haDeshen who writes that it is better to wait until motzei Shabbos to do kiddush levana when one is "mevusam" (hidur) rather than do the it earlier in the week (zerizus). Chasam Sofer finds an answer in our parsha.  Avraham tells Sarah וַיֹּ֗אמֶר מַהֲרִ֞י שְׁלֹ֤שׁ סְאִים֙ קֶ֣מַח סֹ֔לֶת ל֖וּשִׁי וַעֲשִׂ֥י עֻגֽוֹת. Chazal comment: כתיב קמח וכתיב סולת, א״ר יצחק, מכאן שהאשה עיניה צרה באורחים יותר מן האיש. Either you have bread made from kemach, or you have bread made from soles -- kemach is coarse flour; soles is sifted, finer flour.  It can't be both? Chasam Sofer (hakdamah to Chulin, and as a bonus, if you look it up and read the whole piece you will have a nice vort for Chayei Sarah too) explains that Avraham told Sarah to use kemach, as coarse flour does not need to be ground and sifted as much and the bread can be made faster. Sarah, however, decided to use soles instead, as bread made from fine flour may take longer to make, but it is far superior to coarse bread. Avraham preferred the approach of zerizus; Sarah, the approach of hidur.

What about a clash between mitzvah bo yoseir mi'b'shlucho and zerizus or hidur? Is it better to write a sefer Torah yourself even if you have sloppy handwriting (mitzvah bo) or would it be better to delegate it to a sofer who can do a better job (hidur)? Rashi comments on וַיִּתֵּ֣ן אֶל־הַנַּ֔עַר וַיְמַהֵ֖ר לַעֲשׂ֥וֹת אֹתֽוֹ that Avraham gave the cow to Yishmael in order to be mechaneich him in the mitzvah of hachnasas orchim, but gemara (BM 86b) actually writes that there were 3 cows and Avraham gave each one to a different נַּ֔עַר to take care of so that all three could be prepared at once. All things being equal, it would seem that we should apply the rule of mitzbah bo yoseir mi'bshlucho and Avraham should have taken care of things himself. However, all things are not always equal. Had Avraham done everything himself, it would have taken far longer to prepare the food. The advantage of mitzvah bo is offset by the advantage of the hidur of zerizus. Avraham is not content to just serve his guests -- he wants to serve them speedily, with no delay. וַיְמַהֵ֧ר אַבְרָהָ֛ם הָאֹ֖הֱלָה אֶל־שָׂרָ֑ה, he makes haste to tell Sarah to prepare bread; וְאֶל־הַבָּקָ֖ר רָ֣ץ אַבְרָהָ֑ם, he runs to prepare meat. Avraham invented fast food.  The source for the din of zerizus actually comes from Avraham's behavior later in parsha by the akeidah, "VaYashkeim Avraham ba'boker..." (see Pesachim 4 and Tos there).

It's worth noting that Avraham didn't delegate the entire mitzvah of hachnasas orchim; he just delegated one aspect of it. Whether that makes a difference or not may depend on the reason mitzvah bo yoseir mib'shlucho. Rashi explains that the reason is because you get more schar if you do the mitzvah yourself. Ramban in our parsha writes Avraham took care of things himself because of רוב חשקו בנדיבות; if something is important to you, you don't delegate. Investing your own energy and time shows the chashivus of the mitzvah. Others (see Tevuos Shor #28 regarding shlicus by kisuy ha'dam and milah) discuss whether delegating a task shows a lack of respect for the mitzvah. Nafka minah: If it is just a matter of schar or greater hislahavus for the mitzvah, then doing even part of the mitzvah yourself proves that it is something important, something you want schar for. But if delegating the task is a problem if bizayon to the mitzvah, then showing bizayon to even part of a mitzvah would seem to be problematic. One of the classic examples where we apply mitzvah bo is preparing for shabbos. R' Shlomo Zalman held (see Shmiras Shabbos siman 42 footnote 195) that so long as you are not at work or learning, it's not enough to do one thing to prepare for Shabbos and leave the rest to others -- you should take care of everything. Doing part of the mitzvah is not enough.

It's interesting that the gemara writes that whatever Avraham did himself was rewarded directly by Hashem, but what he did via intermediary was rewarded indirectly:

אמר רב יהודה אמר רב, כל מה שעשה אברהם למלאכים בעצמו עשה הקדוש ברוך הוא לבניו בעצמו, וכל מה שעשה על ידי שליח עשה הקדוש ברוך הוא לבניו על ידי שליח. ואל הבקר רץ אברהם – ורוח נסע מאת ה׳ (פ׳ בהעלותך), ויקח חמאה וחלב – הנני ממטיר לכם לחם מן השמים (פ׳ בשלח), והוא עומד עליהם תחת העץ – הנני עומד לפניך שם על הצור בחורב (שם), ואברהם הולך עמם לשלחם – וה׳ הולך לפניהם יומם (שם), יוקח נא מעט מים – והכית בצור ויצא ממנו מים

The example of the latter is drawing water -- יֻקַּֽח־נָ֣א מְעַט־מַ֔יִם, which Rashi explains means יוקח – על ידי שליח. The gemara does not use shechting the cows as an example.

M'inyan l'inyan, I recently saw a discussion in a fascinating sefer called היו דברים מעולם regarding shlichus as opposed to mitzvah bo with regards to another mitzvah in our parsha, that of bikur cholim. R' Leibele Eiger is quoted as saying that his grandfather, R' Akiva Eiger, stopped personally performing the mitzvah of bikur cholim and instead delegated the task to a shliach. According to R' Leibele Eiger it was not lack of time that was the issue, but rather it was the fact that sick people tend to become morose and question why G-d inflicted such pains on them. R' Akiva Eiger did not want to be around people who would voice their complaints about G-d's judgment, so he stayed away. Again, we see mitzvah bo only when all things are equal. Where there are other mitigating factors -- zerizus, hidur, or in this case being exposed to doubts -- you can delegate.

When I told this to my wife, she remarked that allaying people's questions and doubts in their time of suffering rather than avoiding them would seem to fall under the job description of what being a Rav is all about. To be fair, there are other reports written by people (there are two recorded accounts of what the daily schedule of R' Akiva Eiger was like) in which they say that R' Akiva Eiger was meticulous about doing nichum aveilim and bikur cholim for each and every person in need, in direct contradiction to gthe report quoted in the name of R' Leibele Eiger. One also has to wonder if R' Akiva Eiger thought being around doubters was so harmful, how was it fair to send a shliach into such an environment. I don't have answers to these questions.

The book goes on to relate that at the wedding of the young R' Leizer Gordon, who would go on to become the R"Y of Telz (among other accomplishments), the Rav of Kovna was present and he remarked that he usually just hires the "badchanim" for the wedding, i.e he pays for the entertainment, and in this way he is yotzei his mitzvah of being mesameiach chassan v'kallah through shlichus. When the chassan heard this, he immediately raised a kashe. One of the mitzvos for which there is no shiur is mitzvah of hachnasas kallah. If there is no shiur, that means every second the badchan is at the wedding, he has his own mitzvah of simchas chassan v'kallah to fulfill. If he is charged with fulfilling his own mitzvah the whole wedding, how can he also act as the shliach to do the mitzvah for someone else?  You can't do someone else's mitzvah when you have your own chiyuv to fulfill?

The Aderet quotes his brother who answered this kashe by pointing to this story of R' Akiva Eiger. Bikur cholim is also a mitzvah that has no shiur, like hachnasas kallah; therefore, QED, that since RAK"E appointed a shliach, even if a mitzvah has no shiur, shlichus works. (Parenthetically, I recently saw a response that a contemporary Rabbi wrote to a shayla, and in his discussion of the sources, a major one of which happened to be a Shu"T R' Akiva Eiger, this contemporary Rabbi said that they didn't find R' Akiva Eiger's reasoning "persuasive." Now, make no mistake about it -- everyone must call it the way they see it, and if you learn up a sugya and are convinced you are right in your approach, then so be it. That being said, that phrase -- not "persuasive" -- rubbed me the wrong way. The Aderet's whole ra'aya was just from a story about R' Akiva Eiger! He didn't cite a Rambam or a gemara or a din in shulchas aruch. Such is the kavod R' Akiva Eiger deserves. If people like the Aderet who were giants among giants treated a R' Akiva Eiger that way, I would think kal v'chomer a contemporary living in 2025 who finds a teshuvah of RAK"E unpersuasive might consider whether that's a weakness in RAK"E or a weakness in himself.  I guess this Rabbi did and was still convinced he is right, but that phrase still bothered me.)

OK, so you have a story from RAK"E, But what do you do with R' Leizer Gordon's kashe? Two answers: 1) It could be at some point the badchan has "negative kavanah" and has in mind that he does not want to be yotzei the mitzvah himself and can then assign credit to his shliach; 2) When we talk about things that have no shiur, it usually means there is no *minimum* shiur, not that there is no maximum shiur. If so, the badchan just needs to take a moment to fulfill his own mitzvah of simchas chassan v'kallah and can then assign the rest of his time to the mitzvah of his shliach.

(The Aderet goes on to discuss another question that I won't get into now: shlichus does not work for a mitzvah sheb'gufo, e.g. I can't appoint a shliach to do the mitzvah of tefillin for me because the mitzvah is to put tefillin on my arm; the shliach's arm is not my arm. The Aderet suggests in his question that bikur cholim may be a miztzvah sheb'gufo -- tt's your personal presence that is important, not just seeing that the choleh is cared for. Whether or not that is correct is worth looking into).

The sefer has an amazing array of fascinating mareh mekomos from obscure sources, so I am surprised it does not have this RAK"E story which I posted many eons ago from R. Noson Gestetner quoting the Tchibiner Rav: One of R’ Akiva Eiger’s daughters became engaged to someone in another town. RAK”E was already old and could not travel, so he sent R’ Ephraim Zalman Margolias as his shliach to celebrate. Unlike the Beis Ephraim’s usual practice of not lingering at a simcha, in this case he stayed and stayed for the whole party. When asked about it afterwards, R’ E. Z. Margolias explained that shlucho shel adam k’moso, so he wanted to take advantage of every second he could be R’ Akiva Eiger!

Why the need to bring a proof from RAK"E's practice of bikur cholim to the din of simchas chassan v'kallah when you have this story of RAK"E appointing a shliach for gufa the mitzvah of simcha?  I was wondering if it is because this story involves an engagement party, so maybe there is no mitzvah of simchas chassan v'kallah yet at that point, but if so and there is no mitzvah, one wonders how there can be a din of shlichus?  Or why RAK"E would waste time on something that's not a mitzvah?

Let me end off with a final point in machshava. Rashi's view, as I quoted above, is that mitzvah bo yoseir mib'shlucho is so that you can get more schar. The Kozhnitzer Maggid reads Rashi with a twist. The sifrei chassidus explain that the word mitzvah comes from the same root as tzavsa, to be connected. A mitzvah is how we connect and attach ourselves to Hashem. Rashi is not just talking about material reward that one gets from doing a mitzvah, but what Rashi means is that if you delegate the job, you lose out on the schar and the opportunity to make that connection directly with Hashem.  There is no greater reward and nothing as valuable as that.

the reason the malach told Hagar not to flee: how can you leave Eretz Yisrael?!

1) Rashi interprets the angel's question to Hagar, וַיֹּאמַ֗ר הָגָ֞ר שִׁפְחַ֥ת שָׂרַ֛י אֵֽי־מִזֶּ֥ה בָ֖את וְאָ֣נָה תֵלֵ֑כִי (16:8), as a rhetorical device. The angel knew where Hagar had come from and where she was headed to, but wanted an opening to engage her in conversation. Abarbanel, however, reads the pasuk as a statement and not a question:

והנה המלאך אמר לה ראשונה הגר שפחת שרי אי מזה באת ואנה תלכי ר״ל איך לא יעלה על לבך מאין יצאת שהוא בית אברהם עשיר ונדיב לבב אוהב אותך ואנה תלכי במדבר השמם הזה התמצאי בו בית נכבד כבית אברהם הביטי וראי גבול מה שממנו נסוגות וגבול מה שאליו תלכי.

The malach was telling Hagar to think carefully about the fact that she was leaving the home of a rich, benevolent person who loves her to go wander in the desert. For what?  Will the grass really be greener elsewhere?

Seforno also reads the malach's words as a statement, and I think Seforno's reading fits nicelywith theme of our entire parsha, namely the importance of Eretz Yisrael.  Seforno writes that the malach stressed to Hagar that by fleeing she was not just running away from Avahram's home, but also from Eretz Yisrael:  

 והנך הולכת בחוצה לארץ אל מקום טמא ואנשי רשע. 

Such an appeal only makes sense if Hagar could understand the importance of Eretz Yisrael, the kedusha of Eretz Yisrael.  Perhaps it's not by accident that it is davka Hagar's descendants who are fighting us tooth and nail for Eretz Yisrael. 

2) In the last halacha in the last perek of Brachos in the Yerushalmi (67b), there is a sugya that reads as follows:

אַבְרָהָם אָבִינוּ עָשָׂה יֵצֶר הָרַע טוֹב דִּכְתִיב: וּמָצָאתָ אֶת לְבָבוֹ נֶאֱמָן לְפָנֶיךָ. אָמַר רִבִּי אָחָא וְהִפְסִיד אֶלָּא וְכָרוֹת עִמּוֹ הַבְּרִית.

It sounds like R' Acha is asking a kashe, but it's not at all clear what the kashe is or what the teirutz is. How can a person lose anything by overcoming their yetzer ha'ra? Isn't that something we should be striving for? The Pnei Moshe must have been struggling with this point.  In order to make sense of things he changes the girsa. Instead of וְהִפְסִיד, he says the word should be והפשיר. It's not a kashe but rather a statement:

והפשיר עמו וכרות עמו הברית וגו׳ – כצ״ל וכן הוא בסוטה היצה״ר עשה פשרה ושלום עמו ודרש וכרות עמו הברית אדלעיל ומצאת את לבבו וגו׳

Chida in his sefer Rosh David (my cousin-in-law R' Avraham Wagner quotes the mareh makom in his sefer Afar Yerushalayim on the Ylmi) on our parsha defends the original girsa and explains what bothered R' Acha. If you don't have a yetzer ha'ra that fights back, then וְהִפְסִיד, because you lose the reward of overcoming the obstacles, challenges, and difficulties that stand in the way of your avodas Hashem.  We may at times bemoan the fact that we have to struggle so hard, but it is that struggle gives value and meaning to what we achieve.

Chazal tell us (Kid 31a) דְּאָמַר רַבִּי חֲנִינָא: גָּדוֹל מְצֻוֶּוה וְעוֹשֶׂה מִמִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה וְעוֹשֶׂה. Even though one might think that doing something voluntarily is greater than obeying a command to do so, Tos explains נראה דהיינו טעמא דמי שמצווה ועושה עדיף לפי שדואג ומצטער יותר פן יעבור ממי שאין מצווה שיש לו פת בסלו שאם ירצה יניח. When you have to do something, when there is a command to do something, the yetzer ha'ra fights back and tries to stop you. When you do something voluntarily, the yetzer ha'ra doesn't get in the way because there is no penalty for just walking away if things get too tough.  When there is no pressure and no obstacles to success, the accomplishment is not as great, and the reward for success, in turn, is diminished.

The teirutz of the Yerushalmi is that Avraham didn't lose, because it is only as a *result* of his pushing to overcome difficulties and do a milah that Hashem rewarded him with that blessing of וְכָרוֹת עִמּוֹ הַבְּרִית. Turning the yetzer ha'ra to good was not a means to enable him to do the mitzvah without any obstacles, but rather was a reward for having overcome the obstacles and done the mitzvah.

(The Chida gets involved in this whole discussion to solve the following problem: some explain that while Avraham did all mitzvos even without a command from G-d, he did not do a milah until commanded because he wanted to do it as a מצווה ועושה and not as an ֶאֵינוֹ מְצֻוֶּוה. Other mitzvos he could do multiple times, but when it comes to milah, you only have one chance.  Asks Chida: if the advantage of being מצווה ועושה is that you have a yetzer ha'ra to fight against, as Tos explains, then what did Avraham gain?  He had eliminated his yetzer ha'ra? It must be, says Chida, that that transformation too place as a result of the milah, but not beforehand.  Ayen sham for other approaches he offers.)

3) A famous gemara in Brachos 10a

הָנְהוּ בִּרְיוֹנֵי דַּהֲווֹ בְּשִׁבָבוּתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי מֵאִיר וַהֲווֹ קָא מְצַעֲרוּ לֵיהּ טוּבָא. הֲוָה קָא בָּעֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר רַחֲמֵי עִלָּוַיְהוּ כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלֵימוּתוּ. אָמְרָה לֵיהּ בְּרוּרְיָא דְּבֵיתְהוּ: מַאי דַּעְתָּךְ — מִשּׁוּם דִּכְתִיב ״יִתַּמּוּ חַטָּאִים״, מִי כְּתִיב ״חוֹטְאִים״? ״חַטָּאִים״ כְּתִיב.

Beruria tells R' Meir to daven that sin חַטָּאִים, be abolished, but don't pray for the demise of sinners, חוֹטְאִים.

Is there really such a difference between these terms?  Sefas Emes asks: what about the pasuk in our parsha (13:3) ואנשי סדם רעים וחטאים לה' מאד? The word חטאים there refers to the people, not to their actions?  Take a look at the meforshim on the Ein Yaakov.

4) A bit of trivia: a din buried in hilchos brachos that is learned from our parsha. OC 46:4:

צריך לברך בכל יום שלא עשני גוי שלא עשני עבד שלא עשני אשה: הגה ואפי' גר יכול לברך כן

The M"B explains the Rama as follows:

יכול לברך - פי' שיאמר שעשני גר דמיקרי עשייה כדכתיב ואת הנפש אשר עשו בחרן. ויש חולקין בזה וטעמם דלא שייך לומר שעשני דהגיור לא היתה כ"א מצד בחירתו הטובה שבחר בדת האמת

don't throw the raven overboard

The gemara (San 108b) relates that the raven had an iron clad argument to object to being sent out by Noach (parenthetically: the Brisker Rav asks what was the point of sending out the raven and the dove to check if there was dry land?  Even after he found that there was dry land and the ark made landfall, Noach did not leave the teivah until he had a tzivuy from Hashem to do so?):

וַיְשַׁלַּח אֶת הָעֹרֵב״, אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: תְּשׁוּבָה נִיצַּחַת הֱשִׁיבוֹ עוֹרֵב לְנֹחַ. אָמַר לוֹ: רַבְּךָ שׂוֹנְאֵנִי וְאַתָּה שְׂנֵאתָנִי. רַבְּךָ שׂוֹנְאֵנִי – מִן הַטְּהוֹרִין שִׁבְעָה, מִן הַטְּמֵאִים שְׁנַיִם, וְאַתָּה שְׂנֵאתָנִי – שֶׁאַתָּה מַנִּיחַ מִמִּין שִׁבְעָה וְשׁוֹלֵחַ מִמִּין שְׁנַיִם. אִם פּוֹגֵעַ בִּי שַׂר חַמָּה אוֹ שַׂר צִנָּה, לֹא נִמְצָא עוֹלָם חָסֵר בְּרִיָּה אַחַת? אוֹ שֶׁמָּא לְאִשְׁתִּי אַתָּה צָרִיךְ

אָמַר לוֹ: רָשָׁע! בַּמּוּתָּר לִי נֶאֱסַר לִי, בַּנֶּאֱסָר לִי לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן?

How does Noach's response address the complaint of the raven?  How did Noach justify sending it out when there was no other raven left for its mate?  Maharasha comments as follows:

מזה דרשו שראה נח תשובתו הנצחת ...ואמר ליה נח רשע וכו' קראו רשע על שעבר על מצות קונו לשמש בתיבה וז"ש במותר לי נאסר בתיבה בנאסר לי עם אשתך לא כל שכן שלא אעבור על מצות קוני והיה לו זה קצת תשובתו דלכך שלחתיך לפי שאתה רשע ושמשת בתיבה ואין לחוש עליך כמו על שאר העופות גם כי אשתך הרה ממך ונמצא שאין עולם חסר בריה ובבריות אחרות שלא שמשו יש לחוש על כך שיהיה חסר במינם

Simple pshat in Maharasha is that Noach was telling the ravan that since he is a rasha, he deserves to be gotten rid of and that's why he is kicking him overboard.

R' Mordechai Kukis (R"Y of Porat Yosef) quotes his son, R' Uriel, in a one line footnote here, who says a brilliant pshat that flips the gemara and Maharasha on its head.  The ravan at this point had nothing going for it. By rights, it had lost its "zechus ha'kiyum," it had forfeited whatever merit it had to be saved in the ark and be spared the plight of all the other creatures.  But Noach wasn't trying to get rid of him.  Aderaba, Noach was throwing the raven a life preserver!  Why did Noach send out the raven?  Because he was giving the raven something positive to do that would benefit everyone -- go out a see if there is dry land and food -- so that the raven could restore that "zechus ha'kiyum" and prove that it still has value, it still deserves a chance to live, despite the fact that it had sinned.  

Chazal are not telling us Dr Doolittle stories. Chazal are trying to teach us a lesson for our own behavior. When someone has done wrong, the solution is not necessarily to throw them overboard. Sometimes the solution is to give them an avenue to build themselves up again, find a way for them to restore their sense of self worth and their sense of brining value within the community.