sechora with peiros sheviis

Yesh lachkor whether the issur of sechora with peiros sheviis stems from the fact that if one uses the peiros for barter one cannot fulfill the mitzvah of achilas peiros, or whether sechora is an independent issur? 

Ramban counts the mitzvah of achilas peiros sheviis as a mitzvas aseh, and cites the derasha of l'achla v'lo l'sechora as his source, implying that the problem with sechora is that it negates the possibility of fulfilling the mitzvah of achila.  Rambam never counts eating peiros as its own mitzvah, so sechora must be an indepdent issur.

 

The Steipler suggests that this question may underpin a sasfeik in the gemara.  (Bechoros 12b) discusses whether one can use an animal purchased with peiros sheviis to be podeh a peter chamor. 

 

לפדות בבהמת שביעית ודאי לא תיבעי לך לאכילה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה כי תיבעי לך ספק

 

Rashi explains:

 

ודאי לא תיבעי לך. פטר חמור ודאי לא תיבעי לך דכיון דבעי למיתב פדיונו לכהן לא פריק ליה דלאכלה אמר רחמנא ולא לסחורה ונמצא זה קונה חמור בפירות שביעית שאינו ראוי לאכילה: ספק. כגון שילדה אמו זכר ונקבה דאמר במתני' מפריש טלה והוא לעצמו:

 

In a case of safeik peter chamor you have to be mafrish a lamb to remove the issur hanaah from the chamor, but you don't have to give it to the kohen because ha'motzi mei'chaveiro alav ha'raaya.  The pediya = sechora, but the lamb can still be still eaten by the owner.

If sechora is a problem because it negates the mitzvah of achila, in this case there should be no issue because the owner can eat it.  But if sechora is an issur in its own right, then this case should pose a problem.

a hatred that never goes away

וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ וּשְׁכַבְתֶּ֖ם וְאֵ֣ין מַחֲרִ֑יד וְהִשְׁבַּתִּ֞י חַיָּ֤ה רָעָה֙ מִן־הָאָ֔רֶץ וְחֶ֖רֶב לֹא־תַעֲבֹ֥ר בְּאַרְצְכֶֽם׃

וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃

 

 

Ohr haChaim asks: if וְנָתַתִּ֤י שָׁלוֹם֙ בָּאָ֔רֶץ , then what does the next pasuk mean וּרְדַפְתֶּ֖ם אֶת־אֹיְבֵיכֶ֑ם?  If there is peace, then who are the enemies that need pursuing?

 

Many of the meforshim answer that the pasuk is not speaking about what takes place within Eretz Yisrael, but rather it is speaking about enemies outside Eretz Yisrael.  Ohr haChaim explains ומה שקרא אותם הכתוב אויבים, לא לצד שהם באים לצור על עיר הקודש שאם כן אין בטח ואין שלום ליושביה, אלא קרא אותם אויבים לצד אויבי ה׳ רשעי הגוים נקראים אויבי ה׳ ואויבינו.  He assumes that "oyeiv" means a physical threat, and he is therefore left with a problem: If there is peace in Eretz Yisrael, then there is no threat, so how does the term make any sense?  The O.C. does not consider the possibility that although we may have peace in Eretz Yisrael, there might still be Jews remaining in the diaspora who would have to deal with oyvim and physical threats.  Maybe idea that Jews would remain in disapora lands where they have to face the physical threat of oyvim when there is peace and bracha in Eretz Yisrael  is too silly and remote an idea to even consider. In any case, his solution is that oyvim does not just mean a physical threat, but can also mean אויבי ה׳.

 

The Ohr haChaim then adds something else.  I think the biggest mistake people have made in the past 2 years comes from not knowing this Ohr haChaim.  The history books are filled with the bloody and tragic stories of how Jews have been treated in Europe through the centuries: the endless cycle of pogroms, blood  libels, crusades, persecutions, inquisitions, and finally in our time, the Holocaust.  For some reason we thought this time would be different.  We thought this time the world had learned a lesson.  We thought barbaric attacks against Jews would not longer be condoned, and certainly not encouraged, by the "civilized" West.  Well, we were fools.  France is the same France of the Dreyfus trial; England is the same England that stopped Jews from escaping to Israel in the years preceding and during WWII, the same England that turned a blind eye to Arab violence against Jews under the Mandate.  Ohr haChaim writes  גם לצד שיודע ה׳ כי כל האומות שונא ישראל בטבע המתקנא והיא שנאה יסודית ואין לה תמורה.  And if you don't think that statement applies to the US of A, you are delusional.  

Are there individuals who are exceptions to the rule?  Of course there are.  But the exceptions are just that: exceptions.

I was reading Yardena Schwartz's book Ghosts of a Holy War: The 1929 Massacre in Palestine That Ignited the Arab-Israeli Conflict and every couple of pages she has to bring up the attack by Baruch Goldstein in Chevron, as if to provide something to stack up on the scale and provide balance against the litany of violance perpetrated by the Arabs.  What the author does not grap is that Goldstein is the exception that proves the rule.  For the most part, the Jews have not engaged in murder, in violent attacks, against the Arab population.  Goldstein was widely condemned by all segments of Israeli society.  The attacks against the Jews, however, are the rule.  The few Arabs who saved Jews during the Hebron massacre, the umos who saved Jews during the Holocaust, during other uprisings, had to stand against the masses who did engage in violance, and to this very day, celebrate that violence.  

 

The very next pasuk  וְרָדְפ֨וּ מִכֶּ֤ם חֲמִשָּׁה֙ מֵאָ֔ה וּמֵאָ֥ה מִכֶּ֖ם רְבָבָ֣ה יִרְדֹּ֑פוּ וְנָפְל֧וּ אֹיְבֵיכֶ֛ם לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ ends with exactly the same words וְנָפְל֥וּ לִפְנֵיכֶ֖ם לֶחָֽרֶב׃ as our pasuk.  Why the word for word repitition?  Ibn Ezra answers: ונפלו אויביכם – פעם אחרת, שיפלו פעם אחרי פעם בלי תקומה.  Don't think that once you win the battle you are done.  We are dealing with, like the O.C. writes, a hatred that is built into the DNA of many people.  It will never go away.  Sadly, this is a battle that must be fought again, and again, and again.  

Rambam/Raavad on allegorical readings of pesukim

Rambam opens the last chapter of Mishne Torah telling us that in the days of mashiach the lion will not literally lie down with the lamb; it's just a mashal that means Israel will be at peace with its neighbors:

 אל יעלה על הלב שבימות המשיח יבטל דבר ממנהגו של עולם. או יהיה שם חידוש במעשה בראשית. אלא עולם כמנהגו נוהג. וזה שנאמר בישעיה וגר זאב עם כבש ונמר עם גדי ירבץ משל וחידה. ענין הדבר שיהיו ישראל יושבין לבטח עם רשעי עכו"ם המשולים כזאב ונמר. שנאמר זאב ערבות ישדדם ונמר שוקד על עריהם. ויחזרו כולם לדת האמת. ולא יגזלו ולא ישחיתו. אלא יאכלו דבר המותר בנחת עם ישראל. שנאמר ואריה כבקר יאכל תבן. וכן כל כיוצא באלו הדברים בענין המשיח הם משלים. ובימות המלך המשיח יודע לכל לאי זה דבר היה משל. ומה ענין רמזו בהן:

 

Raavad argues by cryptically simply quoting a pasuk from our parsha:

 

כתב הראב"ד ז"ל והלא כתוב בתורה והשבתי חיה רעה מן הארץ

 

What is his objection?  Just like the pasuk in Yeshayahu is a mashal, this pasuk is a mashal as well!  As Radbaz writes

 

ואין זו השגה, כמו ששאר הכתובים משל גם זה משל על אומה רעה כמו שדרשו על חיה רעה אכלתהו

 

The Margoliyos haYam (Sanhedrin 72) puts this Rambam together with another machlokes Rambam/Raavad l'shitasam.  The pasuk tells us with respect to ba ba'machteres אם־זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו שלם ישלם אם־אין לו ונמכר בגנבתו (Shmos 22).  The gemara in Sanhedrin darshens as follows:

 

ת"ר אין לו דמים אם זרחה השמש עליו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שאין לו שלום עמך הרגהו ואם לאו אל תהרגהו תניא אידך אם זרחה השמש עליו דמים לו וכי השמש עליו בלבד זרחה אלא אם ברור לך כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו ואם לאו הרגהו

 

The gemara interprets the term  אם זרחה השמש עליו to mean that it has to be clear as day that the ganav will allow nothing to stand in his way. The Rambam paskens (Geneiva 9:10)

 

היה הדבר ברור לבעל הבית שזה הגנב הבא עליו אינו הורגו ואינו בא אלא על עסקי ממון אסור להרגו ואם הרגו הרי זה הורג נפש שנאמר אם זרחה השמש עליו אם ברור לך הדבר כשמש שיש לו שלום עמך אל תהרגהו. לפיכך אב הבא במחתרת על בנו אינו נהרג שודאי שאינו הורגו. אבל הבן הבא על אביו נהרג:

 

Raavad disagrees and writes that a ba ba'machteres can never be killed if he comes during the day. אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.  Irrespective of the derasha of Chazal, if the words of the pasuk tell us that אם זרחה השמש עליו, that when the sun is shining you can't kill the ganav, then we have to respect the literal meaning of the text.

 

Now we understand, says the Margoliyos haYam, what the Raavad's objection is in that last chapter about mashiach.  The Raavad l'shitaso holds that you can allegorize and take pesukim of navi as a mashal, but when it comes to words written in the chumash, you cannot ignore the literal meaning of the text. The punchline of Raavad's hasaga is **והלא כתוב **בתורה, and since we are dealing with a pasuk in chumash, it's a whole different ball game.  If the Torah tells us that the lion will change its ways, then it means animals won't behave the same.  Torah is on a different level than neviim and kesuvim, and אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו.

 

There is a danger of getting involved in issues that relate to ikkarei emunah, so with that caveat and the hope that I am not making an error, I was thinking that this machlokes l'shitasam is reflected as well in the famous machlokes Rambam and Raavad in ch 3 of hil teshuvah.  Rambam writes that someone who thinks והאומר שיש שם רבון אחד אבל שהוא גוף ובעל תמונה is an apikores.  Raavad comments:

 

א"א ולמה קרא לזה מין וכמה גדולים וטובים ממנו הלכו בזו המחשבה לפי מה שראו במקראות ויותר ממה שראו בדברי האגדות המשבשות את הדעות:

 

The usual hesber people give to the machlokes is that the Raavad of course accepted the incorporeality of G-d as a given.  What Raavad is objecting to is the labelling of everyone who thinks otherwise as an apikores.  In Raavad's view someone led astray by their literal reading of the text is an inadvertent apikores, a shogeg, and his heresy should not be held against him.  Rambam disagrees, as "nebach an apikores" is still an apikores (the aphorism quoted in the name of R' Chaim Brisker).  There are no excuses, there is no shogeg, when it comes to errors of belief.

 

Perhaps the Raavad is more tolerant of those led astray לפי מה שראו במקראות because the Raavad l'shitaso holds אין מקרא יוצא מידי פשוטו and the literal reading of the text carries weight despite the derashos of Chazal.  I'm not suggesting Raavad would go so far as to accept the notion of G-d having form, but what I am suggesting is that he at least sees the possibility of a rational, understandable error given the need to preserve the literal reading of the text.  Rambam, on the other hand, holds that even when it comes to the text of the Torah, the derashos of Chazal and/or the principles of ikkarei emunah completely override the literal meaning of the text, so much so that if someone is a literalist and assigns G-d a form, the error is inexcusable. 

some notes from the Ayeles haShachar

Some he'oros from the Ayeles haShachar this week because I am preoccupied.  In some cases I left out his answers and some of the shakla v'terya:

 1) Rashi comments (21:1) לא יטמא בעמיו – בעוד שהמת בתוך עמיו, יצא מת מצוה that a kohen can be mitamei to bury a meis mitzvah.  The Chofetz Chaim writes that so long as there is another jew who can do the burial, it's not a meis mitzvah.  The implication is that if there are only aku"m available, a kohen can be metamei himself.  R' Shteinman asks: the din is that it is preferable to bury a meis by an aku"m on Y"T rishon rather than delay the burial until Y"T sheni.  If the fact that the burial is being done by an aku"m is not enough reason to allow for halanas ha'meis, why is it enough reason to allow for tumas kohanim?

 

2)  וְלַאֲחֹתוֹ הַבְּתוּלָה הַקְּרוֹבָה אֵלָיו - presumably the only way to know that she is a besula is because she has a chazakah as such.  Why does the gemara (Ch 10) never suggest this as the makor for the principle of chazakah?  (True, the gemara talks about examinations that can be performed to ascertain whether someone is a besulah, but it would be a dochak to say that the pasuk is speaking about the specific case that such an exam was done just before aveilus set in.)

 

3) The gedarim of "v'kidashto" are a bit unclear.  The PM"G (OC 53:14) writes that ideally a kohen gets first dibs to be the sha"tz for davening.  There is a a Keren Orah (Horiyos 12) that says if a kohen and a Yisrael have a bris milah on the same day, the mohel should do the bris of the kohen first.  Ah"S raises the question of two burials on the same day.  Does the mitzvah of v'kidashto apply even to a meis (like the din of kibud av v'eim, which continues after death) or not? 

 

4) A kohen asked the Steipler whether he should train his left handed son to be a righty because m'heira yibaneh ha'mikdash and a lefty can't do avodah (Bech 45).  The Steipler quoted a midrash that says all mumim will be healed when mashiach comes, so he has nothing to worry about.  The Ah"S asks: the Rambam brings down the halachos of what constitutes a mum, implying that these halachos are and will be noge'a l'maaseh.

 

5) The gemara equates the fact that a lulav with a split ti'yomes is pasul on Y"T with the fact that it is a shinuy which is koneh in dinei mamonos.  However, R' Elchanan in Koveitz Shiurim (B"K 112) points out that not every mum constitutes a shinuy, e.g. a nick in the ear of a korban is a mum that disqualifies but is not a shinuy that would be koneh.  How do you distinguish between these cases?

 

Yesh lachkor whether the presence of a mum is the sibah which pasels a korban, or whether the mum is a siman that the object is changed from its original state and therefore no longer acceptable?

 

The nicked ear falls into the former category.  The animal is essentially the same animal, but the presence of the nick disqualifies it.  The split ti'yomes falls into the latter category.  It's not the fact that it is pasul which proves that it is a shinuy, but aderaba, it's the fact that it is a shinuy which creates a psul because the object is a different object. 

 

Which category does the mumim of kohanim fall into?  Rashi writes (21:21) that a mum is posel only while it is present מום בו – בעוד מומו בו פסול, הא אם עבר מומו, כשר.  R' Shteinman argues that this proves that it is the presence of the mum which is the psul, not the fact that it indicates a shinuy, otherwise even if the mum is removed, the psul should still remain.  (Why this is true is a but unclear to me, but I think he means is that when something is acquired through a shinuy, if the shinuy is removed, the object does not revert back to the original owner.  So too, if mum is a psul because it indicates that there is a shinuy, it is the fact that the shinuy happened which is the psul, it is the change which occurred, irrespective of whether it can be undone or not.)

 

6)  וּמִיַּד בֶּן נֵכָר לֹא תַקְרִיבוּ אֶת לֶחֶם אֱלֹקיכֶם מִכׇּל אֵלֶּה כִּי מׇשְׁחָתָם בָּהֶם מוּם בָּם לֹא יֵרָצוּ לָכֶם. (22:25) Is there a din of "ritzuy" by the korban of an aku'm?  The gemara (Zev 45b) writes that עובדי כוכבים לאו בני הרצאה נינהו:  Similarly the Hagahos Ashr"I in Baba Basra explains the reason that we cannot accept tzedakah from an aku"m but can accept korbanos nedava from them is because there is no kaparah associated with korbanos nedava [tzedakah is a mechapeir!]  Some therefore explain that the end of our pasuk is not talking about the particular case of korbanos aku"m, but in a more general sense.

 

7) The gemara writes that the issur of oso v'es bno only applies when shechita is done, but not if you just stab the animal.  The gemara doesn't mean davka shechita, but rather means whatever the halachically proper way to kill the animal is, as we see from the fact that oso v'es bno applies to the sa'ir la'Azazel pushed off the cliff on Y"K.  Yesh lachkor according to R' Akiva who holds (Chulin 17a) that during the 40 years in the midbar shechita was not required on non-korban meat, was there an issur of oso v'es bno?  Does the gemara mean there was no din of shechita then, or for those 40 years was stabbing the animal the equivalent of shechita? 

 

8) בַּחֹדֶשׁ הָרִאשׁוֹן בְּאַרְבָּעָה עָשָׂר לַחֹדֶשׁ בֵּין הָעַרְבָּיִם פֶּסַח לַה׳.  (23:5)  14 Nisan is not a moed.  Why is it listed here? 

 

9) Yesh lachkor whether וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is a tnai in the mitzvah of lekichas lulav, and therefore if someone is noteil lulav but is not b'simcha while doing so his mitzvah of netilas lulav is lacking, or whether  וּשְׂמַחְתֶּם לִפְנֵי ה׳ אֱלֹקיכֶם שִׁבְעַת יָמִים is its own mitzvah which netilas lulav is one element of fulfilling.  (According to the Bikurei Yaakov's understanding of the Rambam the mitzvah of netilas lulav for 7 days applies in Yerushalayim even today.)

 

10) Does someone who is sitting in the sukkah have to leave to go inside and shower for Shabbos?  Would we not apply the rule of oseik b'mitzvah patur min ha'mitzvah here?

 

11) The gemara writes that there was (at one point in time) a special bracha associated with lechem ha'panim so that even if a person ate only a small portion (less than a k'zayis) he would feel satiated.  Yesh lachkor in that case whether a person would have to say birkas ha'mazon.  On the one hand it is "v'savata" from the eating, but on the other hand less than a k'zayis is not considered a maaseh achila.

 

12)  וַיַּנִּיחֻהוּ בַּמִּשְׁמָר (24:123)  Was that just so he would not run away, or is there a din that required putting such a person in prison?

 

13) Rashi comments on  וְרָגְמוּ אֹתוֹ כׇּל הָעֵדָה that from here we learn כל העדה – במעמד כל העדה, מכאן ששלוחו של אדם כמותו.  R' Akiva Eiger (Kid 41) points out that the gemara never suggests this as a source for the din of שלוחו של אדם כמותו.  Interestingly the Sifra which is the source for the first half of Rashi's statement --  בְּמַעֲמַד כָּל הָעֵדָה --  omits the second half.  As Ah"S points out, if everyone (כל העדה) was in fact present, then you don't need a din of shlichus here.  The first half of Rashi/Sifra seems to contradict the second half. 

tochacha is not just for others; Torah on one foot

1) R' Gershon Edelstein z"l points out that the mitzvah of tochacha doesn't just mean going around and telling other people what they are doing wrong.  Rabbeinu Yonah writes in the Shaarei Teshuvah 2:26

וְיִתְבּוֹדֵד בְּחַדְרֵי רוּחוֹ וְיָשׁוּב יַהֲפֹךְ יַד תּוֹכַחְתּוֹ עַל נַפְשׁוֹ. וְלֹא יִסְמֹךְ עַל תּוֹכַחַת הַמּוֹכִיחַ לְבַדּוֹ.

The mitzvah is also to give oneself tochacha!  Chazal darshen הוכח תוכיח אפילו מאה פעמים.  Certainly this applies to correcting one's own shortcomings.

2) The gemara tells the famous story of the convert who came to Hillel and asked to be taught the entire Torah on one foot.  Hillel responded with a reformulation of v'ahavta l'reiacha kamocha -- don't treat others in a way that you would not want to be treated yourself.  Treat other people with kindness and respect.

What a crazy request -- the whole Torah on one foot?!  Was he just trying to test Hillel's patience?  (discussed this before here)

R' Shlomo Fischer explained that we learn in Avos that על שׁלשׁה דברים העלם עומד.  The world stands on three things: Torah, avodah, and gemillus chassadim.  

The ger was asking Hillel: if you had to choose one of the three -- one foot to stand on instead of three -- which is the most important?

To which Hilel replied: chessed comes before everything else.  Master midos and chessed, and the rest will follow.  

lifnei iveir -- bein adam l'chaveiro or bein adam laMakon? issur klali or issur prati?

R' Yaakov Kaminetzky in Emes l'Yaakov on the parsha sets down a fundamental yesod in understanding lifnei iveir.  We think of lifnei iveir as a bein adam l'chaveiro din, like many of the other dinin in the parsha.  Don't cause someone to trip and come to physical harm, don't give bad advice, don't cause someone spiritual harm by causing them to violate an issur.  R' Yaakov is mechadesh (and others say this as well, e.g. see Koveitz Shiurim from R' Elchanan in Pesachim #95 very muck b'kitzur) that lifnei iveir contains a bein adam laMakom component as well.  When the Torah prohibits eiver min ha'chai, for example, the issur is not just for you to not eat eiver min ha'chai. The issur is for you to cause eiver min ha'chai to be eaten by yourself *or* by others.  To put in another way, not only is there a din klali of lifnei iveir that says not to cause harm, but lifnei iveir is also a prat in every individual lav which extends it to actions done by others.   

(Seems to me that lifnei iveir is like the opposite side of the coin as arvus.  Arvus means (according to some Rishonim) that if someone else needs help to do a mitzvah, even if you've done the mitzvah already yourself, it’s like your chiyuv is incomplete.  Here too, even if you haven’t eaten the eiver min ha'chai, if you enable someone else to do so, your observance of the lav of maachalos assuros is faulty.)

 The difference between these two components comes into play when we speak of lifnei iveir by an aku"m.  The gemara tells us that lifnei iveir applies even to an aku"m, e.g. you cannot offer a piece of eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m to eat.  That din reflects the second element, the bein adam laMakom, of lifnei iveir.  It cannot possibly apply to the bein adam l'chaveiro aspect.  We learn in San 85b  כּוּתִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל הַכָּאָתוֹ וְאִי אַתָּה מְצֻוֶּוה עַל קִלְלָתוֹ.   How then can you be chayav for indirectly causing the aku"m to stumble and fall? 

 

Achronim use this yesod to answer a kasha on the Emunas Shmuel.  The Tur writes that the issur of eiver min ha'chai applies only to kosher animals.  Taz (Y"D 62) asks: בטור כתוב ואינו נוהג אלא בטהורים וקשה למאי נ״מ כ״כ דהא טמאה בלאו הכי אסור .  You can't eat a tamei animal anyway, so l'mai nafka mina whether there is additionally an issur eiver min ha'chai or not?  Emunas Shmuel answers that there is a nafka mina for lifnei iveir.  He writes that lifnei iveir applies only to something which is assur to you.  You can't offer a nazir a glass of wine because were you a nazir, you would not be allowed to drink wine.  You can't give an aku"m eiver min ha'chai because eiver min ha'chai is assur for you to eat.  However, since there is no issur of eiver min ha'chai on a tamei animal, it is not assur for you to eat, and therefore there is no lifnei iveir.  In this case, you can give it to an aku"m.  Asks the Beis haLevi and R' Chaim Ozer (Achiezer III:81): the gemara (BM 10b) speaks about a case of   ֹּ כֹּהֵן דְּאָמַר לֵיהּ לְיִשְׂרָאֵל צֵא וְקַדֵּשׁ לִי אִשָּׁה גְּרוּשָׁה. and Tos says there is lifnei iveir for the yisrael.  A yisrael is allowed to marry a gerusha.  According to the Emunas Shmuel why then is there a problem of lifnei iveir?  How is this case different than offering eiver min ha'chai of a tamei animal to an aku"m?

 

With R Yaakov's yesod we can say the following chiluk.  When it comes to giving eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m, all I have to worry about is the bein adam laMakom din of eiver min ha'chai.  I have no bein adam l'chaveiro obligation viz a viz an aku"m.  Therefore, since on a tamei animal there is no issur eiver min ha'chai, there can't be any lifnei issur of enabling others to eat it.  However, when it comes to a yisrael being mekadesh a gerusha on behalf of a kohen, here the bein adam l'chaveiro also comes into play.  The yisrael may not have an issue to marry a gerusha, so there is no bein adam laMklom issue, but there is a din klali that says he cannot harm his fellow member of Klal Yisrael.  If I can't cause the kohen harm by giving him bad advice, I certainly can't cause him harm by doing kiddushin on he behalf to a woman he is not allowed to marry!

 

There are a few other nafka minos from this yesod:

 

1) R' Akiva Eiger on the first Mishna in Shabbos writes that if you enable someone else to be mechalel shabbos, you violate the lav of lifnei iveir, but that does not make you a mumar.  Only chilul shabbos makes you a mumar.  According to R' Yaakov, the bein adam laMakom of lifnei iveir is a prat in hil Shabbos.  When the Torah commands you not to violate Shabbos, included in that issur is not enabling others to do so.  Therefore, perhaps you would be a mumar.

 

2) The Shach writes (YD 151:6) that the issur derabbanan of afrushei m'isura (similar to lifnei iveir) does not apply to a mumar.  Dagul meiRevava asks why not?  A mumar is still a Jew!  R' Yaakov answers that there is no bein adam l'chaveiro responsibility to a mumar (moridin v'lo maalin), and so the lifnei iveir/afrushei m'isura does not apply.

 

3) R' Akiva Eiger has a safeik whether one can give eiver min ha'chai to an aku"m in need of it for pikuach nefesh.  Does the din of "v'chai ba'hem," the heter of pikuach nefesh, apply to an aku"m, or is that pasuk speaking only to us? R' Yaakov points out that based on the logic of the Emunas Shmuel, lifnei iveir is an extension of that which is assur to me.  If under the circumstance of pikuach nefesh eating eiver min ha'chai is mutar for me, the issur cannot extend to an aku"m.  The whole safeik does not get off the ground.

 

4) The Rama writes that lifnei iveir of avodah zarah is not a yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  What would be the hava amina otherwise?  R' Yaakov explains that if lifnei iveir is not an issur klali but is an extension of the issur avodah zarah, one could argue that it should take on all the parameters of the parent issur including being yei'hareg v'al yaavor.  (I am a bit confused by this point.  If you accept the argument of the Emunas Shmuel l'kula like in the above case, why indeed does it not apply l'chumra here?  The hava amina would seem to be correct!)

 

There are a few other nafka minos as well, ayen sham for more.

korban oleh v'yoreid vs korbanos of metzora

In the case of korban oleh v'yoreid the Torah allows a poor person to bring 2 birds, a chatas and olah, in place of animals.  Sefer haChinuch (mitzvah 123) has a chiddush that if the poor peson voluntarily brings the higher priced animal korban instead of the birds, he is not yotzei.  He explains that the Torah does not want a person to extend himself beyond his means, even if for a good cause.  (Kal v'chomer a person should not live beyond his means and waste $ on nahrishkeit). 

 

Achronim ask the following kashe: a metzora is chayav to bring a chatas, asham, and olah.  If a person cannot afford to bring three animals, the Torah says he can subatitute bird offerings for the chatas and olah.  There is a mishna mefureshes at the end of negaim (14:12) that says that a poor person who brings the regular korban of three animals instead of the birds is yotzei.  If so, that should serve as the binyan av paradigm.  The same din should apply to korban oleh v'yoried.  Why, according to the Chinuch, is there a difference betweem these cases and the poor person is not yotzei with the higher priced korban in the case of oleh v'yoreid?   (See Chasam Sofer Shabbos 132a and see my son's post from 5 years ago on this topic.)

 

The Imrei Emes was asked this kashe and gave a cryptic one sentence answer: oleh v'yoreid is different because the person is missing a korban.  No one understood what he meant -- the poor peson brings a korban, a more expensive one than required in fact, so what is he missing?  When R' Menachem Zemba heard the answer, he deciphered it.  In the case of metzora, the rich person brings a chatas, olah, and asham, as does the poor person.  The only difference is that the poor person substitutes birds in place of animals.  In the case of oleh v'yoreid, the rich person brings one animal as a chatas; the poor person brings 2 birds, one as a chatas, one as an olah.  When the poor person who is chayav chatas and an olah brings a rich person's korban of a single chatas, he is missing something -- he is missing the korban olah that goes with his chatas.  True, he may have spent more money on that single animal, but that doesn't make up for the fact that he is getting off with one korban in place of two. 

 

This is such a great answer you have to wonder why all the other achronim who were spinning their wheels trying to work out a solution didn't come up with it.  There's a great explanation for that as well.

 

The Ohr Sameich once had a dream that he was in the yeshiva shel maalah and the giants of the past were sitting and learning and the Rashba stood up and announced in front of everyone that there is a Jew in Dvinsk who was mechavein l'amita shel Torah more than he was.  The gem (Chulin 22) has a hava amina that an olas ha'of can be offered at night.  Asks the Rashba: avodah is always done during the day.  How can there be even a hava amina of bringing a korban at night?  There must be an error in the girsa.

 

A bunch of years ago I posted the Meshech Chochma's brilliant answer to this Rashba.   He quotes Ibn Erza who explains why it is that the poor person who brings a korban oleh v'yoreid has to being 2 birds in place of the single korban chatas.  When a korban chatas animal is offered there are fats brought on the mizbeiach and meat eaten by the owner.  A bird chatas ha'oef has no fat or meat that is offered.  Just the blood is offered.  Therefore, says Ibn Erza, the chatas bird has to be paired with an olah.  The olah is offered in its entirety, with all the meat, and it therefore makes up for the missing fats that are normally part of the chatas. 

 

Avodah cannot be done at night, but hekter chalavim, the burning of the korban fats, can be.  Since the bird olah is a substitute for the fats of the animal chatas, one might therefore have a hava amina that it can be brought at night, akin of hekter chalavim, kah mashma lan. 

 

Queue applause from the Rashba.

 

In light of this yesod the Imrei Emes's argument takes a hit.  The reason a poor person has to bring the olah bird is because he needs to make up for the missing fats.  Were he to bring an animal chatas, he is not missing anything.  He doesn't need the make up korban because the animal korban is all inclusive.

R' Shayaleh's yahrzeit? Yom haAtzmaut?

Such is the state of the world in which we live that in some shuls if I were to give a klop on the bimah this morning and announce no tachanun because it is Reb Shayale's yahrzeit, no one would bat an eyelash, but were I to give a klop and say no tachanun because Yom ha'Atzmaut, that's a whole different ball game.  

Probably the most important thing is not to descend into the sefirah trap of "lo nahagu kavod zeh la'zeh" whatever you personally do.  

why Nadav and Avihu had to be punished; how the opening of the parsha of kashrus is a response to their sin

1) Earlier this year  on parshas zachor I revisited the yesod the Meshech Chochma quotes from the Rambam many places: a nevuah l'tovah that is related to others can never be rescinded and must come true.   This is why Shaul could not do teshuvah for sparing Agag.  The punishment of  קָרַע ה׳ אֶת⁠ מַמְלְכוּת יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָלֶיךָ הַיּוֹם was linked to a promise l'tovah to David, וּנְתָנָהּ לְרֵעֲךָ הַטּוֹב מִמֶּךָּ, and a nevuah l'tovah cannot be undone.  R' Yosef Shaul Nathanson in Divrei Shaul uses this same yesod to explain why Nadav and Avihu had to receive punishment.  Their misa was linked to the positive outcome of creating a kiddush Hashem for the masses, as Moshe told Aharon  הוּא֩ אֲשֶׁר⁠־דִּבֶּ֨ר ה׳  לֵאמֹר֙ בִּקְרֹבַ֣י אֶקָּדֵ֔שׁ וְעַל⁠־פְּנֵ֥י כׇל⁠־הָעָ֖ם אֶכָּבֵ֑ד.  When there is a positive outcome involved, the nevuah must come to fruition. 

2) Rashi comments on  וַיֹּ֨אמֶר מֹשֶׁ֜ה אֶֽל⁠־אַהֲרֹ֗ן קְרַ֤ב אֶל⁠־הַמִּזְבֵּ֙חַ֙  that שהיה אהרן בוש וירא לגשת, אמר לו משה: מה אתה בוש? לכך נבחרת.  I heard the following pshat a few weeks ago but can't recall who says it: When Moshe was first chosen to be a navi by Hashem at the burning bush, he had a whole back and forth argument with G-d.  Moshe insisted that he was not the right one for the job.  Finally, Hashem had enough.  We read  וַיִּֽחַר⁠־אַ֨ף ה׳ בְּמֹשֶׁ֗ה וַיֹּ֙אמֶר֙ הֲלֹ֨א אַהֲרֹ֤ן אָחִ֙יךָ֙ הַלֵּוִ֔י יָדַ֕עְתִּי כִּֽי⁠־דַבֵּ֥ר יְדַבֵּ֖ר ה֑וּא וְגַ֤ם הִנֵּה⁠־הוּא֙ יֹצֵ֣א לִקְרָאתֶ֔ךָ וְרָאֲךָ֖ וְשָׂמַ֥ח בְּלִבּֽוֹ (Shmos 4:14).  Rashi there writes

ויחר אף – ר׳ יהושע בן קרחה אומר: כל חרון אף שבתורה עושה רושם, וזו לא נאמר בו רושם, לא מצינו שבא עונש עלא אותו חרון. א״ל ר׳ יוסי: אף זה נאמר בו רושם:⁠ב הלא אהרן אחיך הלוי – שהיה עתיד להיות לוי ולא כהן, והכהונה הייתי אומר לצאת ממך, מעתה לא יהא כן, אלא הוא כהן ואתה לוי, שנאמר: ומשה איש האלהים בניו יקראו על שבט הלוי

Moshe here in pour parsha is alluding to this episode from his past.  You know why you were chosen Aharon?  Because I made the mistake of protesting too much, of being too bashful and reluctant to take the job.  So why are you now doing the same, repeating my mistake?  מה אתה בוש?  The whole reason you were chosen, לכך נבחרת, is because you weren't guilty of my error.  Don't make it now.

 

3) The Rishonim address why the laws of kashrus appear in our parsha after the hakamas ha'mishkan, e.g. Abarbanel writes:

 

. אחר שהוקם המשכן והושמו בו כהני ה׳ וצוה להם שלא ישתכרו מפני שעיני ישראל עליהם להודיעם את דבר ה׳ להבדיל בין הקדש ובין החול ובין הטמא ובין הטהור. ולהורות חקי השם הוצרך ית׳ לדבר אל משה ואל אהרן יחד ולהודיעם מה הם הב״ח הטהורי׳ לאכילה

 

Others explain that once the mikdash and kohanim have been sanctified, the parsha can turn its attention to the sanctification of the rest of the nation, which begins with tumah and tahara of food. 

 

I think, in light of a Sefas Emes (5631), that at least the opening of this parsha is also a response to the sin of Nadav and Avihu.  

 

וַיְדַבֵּר ה׳ אֶל⁠ מֹשֶׁה וְאֶל⁠ אַהֲרֹן לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם

דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ מִכׇּל⁠ הַבְּהֵמָה אֲשֶׁר עַל⁠ הָאָרֶץ.

 

Who is the לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם in the first pasuk speaking about?  Rashi opines that it refers to Elazar and Itamar:

 

לאמר אלהם – אמור שיאמרו להם לאלעזר ולאיתמר, או אינו אלא לאמר לישראל? כשהוא אומר: דברו אל בני ישראל (ויקרא י״א:ב׳), הרי דבור האמור לישראל, הא מה אני מקיים: לאמר אלהםא – לבנים, לאלעזר ולאיתמר.

 

Rashbam disagrees and sees the phrase as reflexive, speaking about Moshe and Aharon לאמר אליהם – למשה ולאהרן.  He makes a general observation: ומזה יש להוכיח על כל לאמר הכתוב בוידבר ה׳ אל משה, כי פירושו לאמר למשה.

 

Sefas Emes takes the position that לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם is speaking about Bnei Yisrael.  What then are we to make of the next pasuk   דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר ?  One of the two phrases must be redundant?

 

To answer this question Sefas Emes sets down a yesod based on the Chazal at the end of Makkos  ר' חנניא בן עקשיא אומר רצה הקב"ה לזכות את ישראל לפיכך הרבה להם תורה ומצות שנאמר (ישעיהו מב, כא) ה' חפץ למען צדקו יגדיל תורה ויאדיר.  Rashi/Rivan explain כדי שיהו מקבלין שכר במה שמונעין עצמן מן העבירות לפיכך הרבה להן שלא היה צריך לצוות כמה מצות וכמה אזהרות על שקצים ונבלות שאין לך אדם שאינו קץ בהן אלא כדי שיקבלו שכר על שפורשין מהן.  What Rashi/Rivan is telling us is that R' Chananya ben Akashya didn't mean to say that Hashem dreamt up meaningless, arbitrary laws for us to obey just for the sake of giving us reward.  What he meant is that there are laws in the Torah that would seem to go without saying.  Do you really need a pasuk to tell you not to eat bugs?  Who in their right mind would have an appetite or want to do so anyway?  Nonetheless, Hashem gave us a mitzvah so that we get credit for doing what we might otherwise do anyway.  Ad kan Rashi/Rivan.  The Sefas Emes adds another layer.  If I wouldn't eat pig or bugs anyway, what is Hashem rewarding me for?  The answer is that I am being rewarded not for that what, but for the why. אל יאמר האדם אי אפשי בבשר חזיר רק אפשי ומה אעשה אבי שבשמים גזר עלי. Chazal tell us, "Don't say I don't like pig."  Don't do what you are doing because of your personal taste, your common sense, your intuition, your upbringing, social norms, etc.  Rather do it because Hashem decreed that this is what we have to do.  Do it for the sake of the mitzvah.  Attitude and intent make all the difference 

 

In our parsha, says Sefas Emes, the second pasuk of דַּבְּרוּ אֶל⁠ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל לֵאמֹר זֹאת הַחַיָּה אֲשֶׁר תֹּאכְלוּ address the what.  The first pasuk is needed to address the why.  לֵאמֹר אֲלֵהֶם means don't just tell them what to do, but tell them that I, G-d, and the one telling them to do it.   

 

Nadav and Avihu wanted ruchniyus, so they offered "eish zarah" to achieve that goal.  They were guided by their own subjective intuition rather than the letter of the law.  Therefore, when it came to giving the laws of kashrus, the Torah stressed that even if you wouldn't eat it anyway, what should guide your behavior is not personal, subjective taste, but rather the fact that it is a mitzvah. 

R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach's chiddush on what constitutes a hefsek

No she'hechiyanu is recited in kiddush on shevii shel Pesach.  What if a person made a mistake and accidentally said shehechiyanu?  Is it a hefsek?  Does he have to repeat kiddush?

I would have expected the MB to deal with this, but he doesn't (at least nowhere I could find).  When I raised the question my SIL suggested a parallel to kiddush on second night of R"H.  Even though according to some shitos there is no obligation to say shehechiyanu, which is why we try to have a new fruit or wear new clothes, we are not choshesh that doing so may be a hefsek.  I countered that this is not a good analogy.  Mei'ikar ha'din we pasken that on R"H there is an obligation to say shehechiyanu.  It's nice to be yotzei all shitos and try to have a new fruit, but it's not an absolute requirement.  Shevii shel Pesach is actually the flipside case, as on shevii shel Pesach mei'ikar ha'din there is no obligation at all to say shehechiyanu.

 

R' Shlomo Zalman addresses himself to this question and has an interesting sevara.  R'SZ suggests that hefsek, by definition, is a result of hesech ha'daas.  If you start talking about something else in the middle of making a bracha, it's not the interruption of the words themselves which are the issue, but rather it's the fact that in speaking about something else you are diverting attention and thought away from the bracha.  Therefore, if a person mistakenly thought they were obligated to say shehechiyanu in kiddush, since in their mind they are reciting kiddush as required, there is no hesech hadaas from the bracha, and hence the addition is not a hefsek.

 

Let me give you two sources, one in support of RS"Z's idea, one that poses a difficulty.  Let's say a person recited kiddush only to discover as they are about to drink that the kos was filled with water.  The MG"A (quoted by MB) writes that the person has to repeat kiddush, as they failed to fulfill the chiyuv of reciting kiddush al ha'kos.  However, so long as they intended to drink other wine during the meal which was available on the table, they cdo not repeat borei pri ha'gefen.  That bracha was chal on the wine on the table.  What does this have to do with RS"Z?  Even though the kiddush recited over the cup of water counted for nothing and was a hefsek of meaningless words, we see from the MG"A that it doesn't matter.  The the initial borei pri ha'gefen still stands and can combine with the kiddush now being repeated over the refilled kos.  This fits beautifully with RS"Z's reasoning.  The person was unaware the first time around that the kos had water in it, and so there was never a hesech hadaas from the first moment to the last. 

 

R' Akiva Eiger is not a fan of this MG"A, and he more clearly spells out his shira in the following case in hil havdalah (interestingly also quoted by MB, in the Biur Halacha): one is not permitted to use a candle that was lit b'issur on shabbos for havdalah. The SA writes that the bracha of m'orei ha'eish needs to be repeated if one does so.  R Akiva Eiger jumps in and adds that in this scenario, one has to go back and repeat the borei pri ha'gefen as well.  Since the bracha of me'orei h'eish is invalid, it is a hefsek in the havdalah and invalidates the entire thing.  You can see why l'shitaso RAK"E doesn't like the previous MG"A, and you can see the difficulty this poses to R"SZ's sevara.  There was no hesech hadaas here.  The person intended to recite havdalah.  The only problem was the candle used invalidated the bracha.

 

According to many shitos a woman is not obligated to say the bracha of borei m'orei ha'eish in havdalah.  If she does so, is it a hefsek?  Halichos Beisa is medayek (against the view of R' Tukichinski) from the MB that women may add the bracha if they desire to do so and it is not a hefsek.  Unlike in the cases above where the bracha was invalid, or in the case of shehechiyanu where it is a completely inappropriate addition, in this case the addition is appropriate, just not obligatory.  

A far greater problem is the question of whether a woman answering amein to shehechiyanu in kiddush when she already said the bracha at the time of hadlakas neiros is a hefsek or not.