zechor-na: the mitzvah to remember balak and bilam

The gemara (Brachos 12b) tells us that the Chachamim considered instituting a daily recitation of Parshas Balak along with kri'as shema. The gemara explains the significance of Parshas Balak based on the fact that it contains the pasuk "kara shachav k'ari" as well as an allusion to yetziyas Mitzrayim. However, the Pnei Yehoshua writes that there is more to it than that. The haftarah tells us "Zechor-na mah she'ya'atz Balak...u'meh ana bo Bilam...". From here we see that there is a mitzvah to remember the episode of Balak and Bilam. The Pnei Yehoshua writes that this remembrance must be done by verbally mentioning the parsha, hence the idea of instituting its reading along with shema.

Whether this chiddush of the Pnei Yehoshua is correct is debated by later achronim. Some note that though we do not read the entire Parshas Balak, we do hint to this episode by our recitation of the pasuk "Mah tovu..."

Why does the prophet Michah ask us to remember this parsha in particular? The explanation I once heard from R' Aharon Kahn is that unlike other episodes where the Jewish people knew that they faced grave danger and witnessed G-d's miraculous salvation, in this case the Jewish people would have not known at all that Bilam stood somewhere in the distance plotting their downfall until thwarted by Hashem. This parsha in particular teaches us that there is hashgacha operating behind the scenes saving us from dangers that we may not know about or anticipate.

the difference between Yeshiva University and the chareidi world is...

I was tempted to just leave the body of this post blank to make the point.

A question was raised about whether I would stick to the views of "chareidi gedolim" if there was compelling evidence before my eyes that they were wrong. The problem with these type questions is that they can be asked without the word "chareidi" and the same answer would apply. In this case, let me cite the words of the great "chareidi" gadol Dr. Moshe Bernstein, a professor of Bible at that "chareidi" institution known as Yeshiva University -

"When we confront the problems raised by modern scholarship (and I do not deny that such problems ought to be confronted), we answer those that we can, and allow the rest to remain with tzarikh iyyun gadol, hoping that in the long run, with continued study, investigation and analysis, more and more answers, solutions and resolutions will be found."

There is no substantive difference between YU's approach and that of the "chareidi" world or yeshiva world. Both accept as a matter of course that no matter how compelling the evidence lined up against fundamental beliefs, our commitment to those beliefs remains intact and unwavering. Emunah trumps evidence. The only difference between the YU and chareidi world may be which beliefs are labelled fundamental and which allow for more "wiggle" room -- an important point, but nonetheless a detail against the broader background.

A similar hypothetical -- "If the "Divine truth" is in the pocket of the Charedi, why are they so afraid to teach their students Biblical criticism, the results of archaeological research, and to teach them whether their faith passes the test of reasonable critique?"

Once again, the word "chareidi" is a red herring. R' Aharon Soloveitchik spoke to a packed audience in Lamport auditorium (I was there) on the application of Torah u'Mada (the address is reprinted in "Logic of the Heart, Logic of the Mind") and categorically prohibited studying Biblical criticism. Is YU afraid that the faith of its secularly educated and intellectually sophisticated students will not stand the test of reasonable critique? Apparently intellectual freedom has its limits even in the ivory tower of Yeshiva University, as well it should, given the prohibition to study minus.

Why is there such a penchant to label ideas and opinions "chareidi" as a means to marginalize their significance? "Chareidi" has come to mean something like country-bumpkin, as opposed to we "serious" intellectuals who have the "advantage" of having been exposed to more of the "modern" secular world. The Chazon Ish, the Brisker Rav, R' Ahron Kotler -- are these role models, poskim, gedolim only for the "chareidi" community, or do their words deserve attention by all of klal yisrael, whether you agree with them or not, whether you pasken like them or have your own rav to heed? Of course, other communities who marginalize people like R' Soloveitchik, R' Kook, etc. deserve to be criticized for their small-minded attitude as well, but dwelling on other's wrongs is not an excuse for our own.

rambam's view of ma'aseh braishis and ma'aseh merkava

In a comment to yesterday's post someone mentioned the view of a contemporary Rosh Yeshiva that the Rambam's understanding of ma'aseh Braishis and ma'aseh merkava is erroneous. It is a mistake to think that the approach of this Rosh Yeshiva is a new discovery or a chiddush of "chareidi gedolim" when in fact it has a long history. The Rishonim already took the Rambam to task for interpreting ma'aseh braishis as natural sciences. R' Tzadok haKohen in his discussion of the mitzvah of yichud Hashem in Sefer haZichronos summarizes:

והרמב"ם (פרק ג' וד' מהלכות יסודי התורה) שפירש ענין מעשה בראשית הוא חכמת טבעי הנבראים, מצא בו מבוא תועלת לעבודת השם יתברך לאהבתו ויראתו. ואמנם אם היה זה אמת אצלו אינו אמת לרוב המתעסקים בחכמות אלו, ולא היה ראוי לו לקבוע ידיעת ענינים כאלה בהלכות יסודי התורה שלו כלל, [שהם] דברים שאינם צריכים למאמיני התורה לידיעתם, וכל שכן שהרבה מדבריו אינם אמת כפי דעת חכמיהם היום: והכלל, מה לדברי חכמי אומות העולם עם דברי התורה שמן השמים לעשות דבריהם יסודות לתורה, וכל מה שאסף שם הם מדברי חכמי אומות העולם וראויה להם, שכל חכמתם בחכמה השייכת בעולם הזה וידיעת נבראי העולם הזה מצד טבעם, שהוא כידיעת כל מיני אומניות שאין בזה שייכות לתורה. אבל חכמת מעשה בראשית שזכרו רבותינו ז"ל, שהשיגוה מתוך ספור התורה במעשה בראשית, הוא ידיעת חכמתו יתברך בבריאה זו:

R' Tzadok explains that 1) The Rambam's view that ma'aseh braishis means science is rejected by most of those who study these areas of Torah thought; 2) Knowledge of the type the Rambam provides in Hil Yesodei haTorah regarding the universe has no relevance to those who believe in Torah and should not have been included in his Yad; 3) Much of the knowledge the Rambam records has been proven false by secular scholars. In short: the world of science and philosophy, like all secular disciplines, tells us only about the physical world but not about the theological and mystical secrets which only Torah contains.

R' Tzadok writes earlier in the same chapter regarding ma'aseh merkava:

וכבר מפורסם אצל כל ישראל דברי חז"ל וכל קדושים מחכמי האמת, עניני מעשה מרכבה מה הם. [ואין צורך להשיב כאן על דברי המתפלספים הקדמונים, בפירוש מעשה מרכבה (גם כן) שהוא בהשגת חקירות הפילוסופים בחכמת הטבע ושלאחר הטבע, שכבר תמהו עליהם חכמי הדורות דאם כן כבר נגלו לקטני אומות העולם המסתכלים בספרי חכמיהם, יותר ממה שנתגלה לגדולי הנביאים ברמזים וחידות: ואין צורך להאריך מזה לכשרי ישראל עתה שנתפרסמה חכמת האמת בעולם, מוסכם בפי כל חכמי ישראל האמיתים. וכל הכופר בה הוא מכלל האפיקורסים, וכמו שיתבאר במצות לא תסור, וכמו שכתב בתשובות הב"ח הישנות (סימן ה') דהמלעיג על דברי חכמים ומדבר דופי על חכמת הקבלה, שהיא מקור התורה ועיקרה וכולה יראת שמים, פשיטא דאין לך מזלזל בדברי חכמים גדול מזה שחייב נידוי, עיין שם]:

The Rambam was challenged by earlier authorities, but R' Tzadok adds that with the spread of the study of "chochmas ha'emes" (i.e. mysticism) a consensus has formed among chachmei Yisrael that the Rambam is certainly wrong. Just as in halacha there can arise a consensus of opinion as to what views of Rishonim and Achronim are accepted, so too in the area of hilchos deyos and machshava there can arise a similar consensus. One who denies the truth of mystical teachings is simply mocking the words of Chazal, denigrating fundamental truths of Torah.

Ramban on how Chazal knew so much about the world

Braishis Rabbah 20:4:
A certain philosopher wished to know how long the gestation period of a snake was. When he saw two snakes having intercourse he trapped them in a vat and would feed them, watching to see when they would give birth. When the Zekeinim came to Rome, [the Romans] asked Rabban Gamliel how long the gestation period was and he could not answer them. When Rabbi Yehoshua met Rabban Gamliel he saw that his face was sickly looking [because he was unable to answer]... "The answer is seven years," said Rabbi Yehoshua... " A dog is a chaya temeiya and gives birth after 50 days, a beheima temieya gives birth after 12 months, and the snake is described in the pasuk as "more cursed than all animals and chayos of the field." Just as the beheima's gestation period is 7 times longer than the chaya's, so too the snake's gestation is 7 times longer than the beheima's, hence seven years... When the philosopher heard this he began to bang his head against the wall. He said, "All I have labored to discover in seven years this Chacham was able to give me with the flick of a reed."

The message of the Midrash lies not in the particulars of the case, but in the contrast between the methodology of the "philosopher" or scientist and the methodology of Chazal. Ramban in his essay "Torah Hashem Temima" (p. 158-159 in the Chavel edition) writes that the meaning of the story of "ma'aseh braishis" is hidden and he does not understand it. However, Chachamim did understand the parsha. They were able to intuit from it the order of creation, the measure of the world and knowledge of astronomy and the universe, the calculation of the molad and tekufos, and all sorts of other knowledge which is hinted at in the count of letters, gematriyos, and their secrets. R' Yehoshua's knowledge of a snake's gestation did not require seven years of laborious scientific experimentation to discover but was obtained from Torah alone, based on his interpretation of the pasuk "arur atah...".

Clearly not even every Tanna possessed such knowledge -- Rabban Gamliel did not know the answer to the philosopher's question and admitted as such. And we know that Tanaim and Amoraim tell us that they went to doctors, consulted gentile experts about farming, etc. But that does not mean that such knowledge is not inherent in the Torah and accessible to those who can decode its secrets.

hafrashas terumos and ma'asros and nesina l'kohein: seperate mitzvos or not

Yesterday we learned the Parashas Derachim's chiddush that there are two aspects to the mitzvah of terumos and ma'asros: 1) a mitzvah of hafrasha, seperating a portion to remove the issur of tevel; 2) a mitzvah of nesina, giving the seperated portion to a kohein. The truth is that I had in mind to discuss this idea last week in the context of the mitzvah of challah. The shiur of challah which must be seperated and given to a kohein is 1/24 of the dough for a regular person and 1/48 for a baker. This amount was set by Chazal -- what is the minimum requirement on a d'oraysa level? The Noda b'Yehudah (Mh"T 201, see Minchas Chinuch 385:12) is mechadesh that the minimum shiur depends on whether we are speaking of the mitzvah of hafrasha or the mitzvah of nesina. To remove the prohibition of tevel seperating even the smallest piece of dough suffices; however, to fulfill the mitzvah of nesina requires giving the kohein an amount equal to 1/24 of an isaron (no matter how much dough is kneaded).

Achronim (see Shu"T Shiurei Sheivet haLevi, and apologies because I do not have the sefer at home and I did not jot down the siman) suggest that this chiddush of the Noda b'Yehudah may depend on a machlokes between the Rambam and Ramban. The Rambam counts hafrasha and nesina together as one mitzvah (aseh 133). However, Ramban, disagrees and writes that they should be counted as two distinct mitzvos (see shoresh 12 of Sefer haMitzvos). One of Ramban's many proofs is the fact that we recite a bracha on hafrasha, not on nesina -- if nesina is the culmination of the mitzvah, why would we not recite the bracha at that point?

The Parashas Derachim's reading of the Ra'avad fits nicely with the Ramban's approach -- since kohanim and levi'im can receive a portion of conquered lands, it removes the requirement to give them terumos and ma'asros but does not excuse the mitzvah of hafrasha. At the same time, perhaps the Rambam fits l'shitaso as well. Since hafrasha and nesina go hand in hand, one cannot dismiss one without dismissing the other (though by the same token, since they go hand in hand if hafrasha cannot be dismissed perhaps neither should nesina be, which may be what Ra'avad is driving at).

v'halachta b'derachav -- why only through gemilus chassadim?

Why is it that v'halachta b'derachav, imitating G-d, applies only to his acts of mercy? We are told (Sota 14) that G-d visits the sick, buries the dead, acts charitably, and we are expected to do the same. But no source suggests that just as G-d smites the wicked we should do the same -- a thought that undoubtedly occurred to many who were listening to the Madoff sentencing yesterday. Why not?

The Maharal (Nesiv Gemilus Chassadim) explains that when a person faces a situation that cries out for justice, s/he is forced by circumstance to respond. The same may be said for many types of charity. Giving a quarter to the homeless guy begging for change just to get him to stop annoying you or putting a coin in a pushka to avoid feeling guilty is also just a response to a situation, an means to avoid a negative feeling rather than a desire for constructive good. Situation and circumstance, not a person's inner character, is what motivates these behaviors.

G-d "has" everything; he does not suffer needs and is not compelled by circumstance -- and still he gives. We too can only claim to imitate G-d when we act not because of personal needs or circumstance, but simply because it is the right thing to do. In a word, imitating G-d demands altruism -- a selflessness that motivates one to do good for its own sake alone.

land for a piece (of terumah)

In Parshas Korach we learned that Kohanim and Levi'im do not receive a portion in Eretz Yisrael; instead, they are supported by terumos and ma'asros. The Rambam (Shmita 13:11) writes that this is only true of Eretz Yisrael proper, but if a Jewish king were to conquer lands beyond the boundaries promised to the Avos, then Kohanim and Levi'im would receive a portion. Ra'avad disagrees and argues that if Kohanim and Levi'im did receive land it would mean that they forfeit teru"m. While the Ra'avad viewed such an exemption as a reductio ad absurdum, the Kesef Mishne comments that the Rambam may indeed have held that there can be Jewish controlled land which is exempt from terumos and ma'asros. As proof, he points to the example of Surya, land conquered by David haMelech which was exempt.

The Parashas Derachim (derush 6) writes that the Ks"M erred in his reading of the Ra'avad. There are two seperate mitzvos involved in terumos and ma'asros: 1) seperating the ter"m from the tevel wheat; 2) giving the kohein the seperated portion. The Ra'avad meant that if Kohanim received a portion of land, they could not collect the tithed portion of the crop -- mitzvah #2 would not apply. But without question the farmer would have to still perform mitzvah #1 to remove the prohibition of eating tevel.

The example of Surya, writes the Parashas Derachim, is a red herring because crops in those lands are exempt from both mitzvah #1 and mitzvah #2, a clear indication that the exemption has nothing to do with Kohanim receiving a portion of those lands. The gemara tells us that Surya was a special case because David conquered those lands out of order (he should have conquered Yerushalayim first) and hence they had an incomplete kedusha.

The Parashas Derachim raises an interesting question: is the seperation of teru"m an independent mitzvah from giving teru"m or are they two parts of the same coin? For those who were not reading three years ago when we first discussed this, maybe a quick review with some new points next post.

b'derech she'adam rotzeh lei'lech

How could the Jewish people still think that Moshe was following his own agenda after they witnessed the earth swallow Korach? R' Tzadok haKohen (Tzidkas haTzadik #64) explains:

פעמים שרואה בבירור שהשם יתברך מסייעו ומסכים עם מעשיו, עם כל זה אינו ראיה כי מעשיו ישרים באמת, ועל זה נאמר ישעיה מ"ח י"ז) מדריכך בדרך תלך ודרשו חז"ל (מכות י' ב) בדרך שאדם רוצה לילך מוליכין אותו. [ואמר בדרך דרצה לומר בספר משלי דרך התורה כמו שכתבתי לעיל (אות מ"ח), כי אין השם יתברך מסייע אלא כשהוא על פי דעתו הולך בדרך התורה. ומה שלמדו מבלעם גם לפי דעתו של בלעם כפי סיטרא דיליה היה דרך זה ישר לו כפי מה שהוא,
. . וזה היתה גם כן התלוננות בני ישראל (במדבר י"ז ו') אתם המיתם את עם ה', אף על פי שראו הפלגת הנס באבדם, מכל מקום חשבו על זה כי לא בשמים הוא ואין לסמוך על זה שהדין עם משה ואהרן נגד קרח ועדתו, רק אתם רציתם לילך בדרך זה וזכותכם גדול ולכך המיתם וגו'

Hashem will assist a person along the path he thinks is "derech haTorah" even to the point of performing miracles on his behalf -- but that is no proof that the person is correct!

This same idea is found a few parshiyos earlier. Chazal (Shabbos 87) tell us that Moshe seperated from Tziporah of his own volition, based on his understanding of his role as Navi, and Hashem affirmed his assessment and choice of action. Why then was Miraim critical of this move? Tosfos answers that Hashem may have approved because "b'derech she'adam rotzeh leilech molichin oso", Hashem assists a person achieve what he thinks Torah requires even if objectively speaking he is misguided.

Looking back at last week's parsha, Rashi writes that the choice to send spies was Moshe's decision and not commanded. Ramban disagrees -- 'shlach' is a command, notwithstanding the extra word 'lecha'. In defense of Rashi perhaps we can say that 'shlach' indeed is a command, but such a command originated in Moshe or the people's perception that such a mission was necessary.

R' Tzadok haKohen on Korach's rebellion

Does a garment entirely dyed with techeiles still need a single string of techeiles on its tzitzis?
Does a house filled with seforim still need a mezuzah?

According to the Midrash these are the questions Korach used to make his point. Does a people perfect in yirah, represented by the techeiles which alludes to Heaven, and perfect in knowledge of Torah, represented by a house filled with seforim, need a single leader or kohein to rule over them?

R' Tzadok haKohen (Pri Tzadik, Korach 2) explains that Korach's error was not misjudging the level of the people's religiosity -- had there been no truth to his claim that "the entire nation is holy" it would never have been incorporated into the Torah's narrative. Rather, Korach's error was in assuming that this pinnacle of spiritual perfection is a self-sustaining safe landing point after which no further leadership or direction is needed.

Korach's punishment was to descend "chaim she'olah", into the depths of hell while still remaining alive. The lesson: Without leadership establishing safeguards a person can be spiritually "alive", perfected, "bshleimus hakedushah", as R' Tzadok writes, yet still find himself in gehenom.

maharal on why is Ya'akov not mentioned in Korach's lineage

The Torah introduces Korah by recounting his lineage -- "ben Yitzhar ben Kehas ben Levi". Rashi asks why the Torah did not go one step further and trace Korach's ancestry back to Ya'akov Avinu. He answers that Ya'akov davened that his name should not be joined in partnership with evil.

The Torah usually does not trace back the lineage of heroes or villains all the way to the Patriarchs. Why here does Rashi see the omission of Ya'akov's name as significant? And even if Ya'akov's name is not mentioned, don't we all know that he is the father of Levi and therefore the great-great-grandfather of Korach?

Maharal explains that the Torah here is not simply introducing Korach, but condemning him. Because Korach was a descendant of a prominent family within the prominent tribe of Levi, his guilt is that much worse. Korach had excellent role models to learn from and failed to follow their example. That failure might have been further emphasized by highlighting Korach's failure to live up to the model of Ya'akov Avinu. However, Ya'akov did not want to be associated with the condemnation of his descendants, and therefore he is not mentioned.

How does a Korach come out of such an illustrious family? The Maharal explains that every tzadik has elements of "psoles" -- there are imperfections, however slight, in the character of even the greatest people. Children absorb everything, and flaws in a parent can be magnified many times over when passed to the next generation. Korach's parents and grandparents in this way all contributed in some way to shaping his flawed character. The only exception is Ya'akov Avinu, who reached a degree of perfection that did not allow for defects to pass to his children. The lineage which shaped Korach stops at Levi, for Ya'akov had no part in the flaws which later emerged.

Lost opportunities and the failure to live up to expectations can create a devastating burden of guilt. Yet, beneath those layers of failure there always remains the pure spark of Ya'akov Avinu that does not condemn. There is always a point within each person that remains disassociated from past failure which -- if the person chooses -- can be the foundation for new growth.

The Shem m'Shmuel (1910) writes that each of our Shabbos meals and tefilos correspond to one of the Avos: Friday night=Avraham; Shabbos morning=Yitzchak; Shalosh Seudos=Ya'akov. Unlike Avraham, who was the father of Yishmael as well as Yitzchak, and Yitzchak, who was the father of Eisav as well as Ya'akov, Ya'akov Avinu had no offspring who were outside the fold of Klal Yisrael -- there is no "psoles" that remained in Ya'akov which could corrupt any of his offspring. As a Jew goes through Shabbos, h/she reaches deeper and deeper inside him or herself to connect back to the spritual roots which the Avos planted within each and every Jew. On Friday night a person reaches into him/herself and connects with Avraham; at lunch he/she connects with Yitzchak. In each of these stages there is still something missing, there is still "psoles", there is still the taste of "chol" that interferes with Shabbos. But by Shabbos afternoon a person has absorbed enough kedushas Shabbos so that he/she can reach deeper still and connect to Ya'akov Avinu, a level of spirituality that is untainted and uncorrupted by whatever may have transpired in the previous week. Even though grammatically the third meal should properly be called "seudah shlishis", we refer to it as "shalos seudos", three meals, because this third meal can perfect and correct whatever was missing in the previous seudos and bring us to a mindset of "kulo Shabbos", without "psoles".

3 Tamuz

Maybe m'mah nafshach you skip tachanun this morning -- life doesn't have to be either/or.

3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of R' Shneur Kotler zt"l

3 Tamuz - yahrzeit of the Lubavitcher Rebbe zt"l

is a female kohein included in the issur of zarus

The Rambam defines a zar in hilchos bi'as mikdash ch. 9:

ב איזה הוא זר: כל שאינו מזרע אהרון הזכרים--שנאמר "וערכו, בני אהרון" (ויקרא א,ח), "בני אהרון" ולא בנות אהרון.

The Minchas Chinuch on this week's parsha (390) quotes the safeik of the Parashas Derachim whether a woman kohenet has the status of a zar and is included in the prohibition of "v'zar lo yikrav aleichem". Is the exclusion of "bnei Aharon v'lo bnos Aharon" a giluy milsa that women are also defined as zarim or is it a seperate din, an issur aseh? From the defintion of zar which the Rambam offers -- all who are not male kohanim -- it does appear that woman are included in the lav.

R' Yosef Engel (Esvan D'Oraysa #19) points out that the gemara (Zevachim 15b) derives from "v'yinazru m'kodshe bnei Yisrael" that there is a seperate prohibition of performing avodah which defiles korbanos. Even if a woman is not included in the prohibition of zarus, because her avodah is invalid she would be in violation of this lav of defiling kodshim.